DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

In order to accomplish the assigned mission, the joint force commander develops a concept of operation and organizes forces based on that concept. The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in the plan, while preserving the responsiveness of individual component capabilities. Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of all available forces. Decentralized execution is essential to generate the tempo of operations required and to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat.

Related Terms

centralized planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

DECEPTION

Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. JP 1-02

See military deception.

DECISION CYCLE

The figure below shows the decision cycle. This model is applicable to all command and control (C2) systems — friendly or adversary. This decision model is based upon the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act loop.

Observation. In the observation portion of the decision cycle, the commander gathers information from the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) apparatus and from status reports of friendly forces. Much of a commander's RSTA capability and knowledge of the status of friendly forces will come from the control portion of the friendly force C2 system — that is, from subordinate commanders.

Orientation. In the orientation phase of the decision cycle, information about the opposition's status received in the observation portion of the cycle is converted into intelligence through the commander's intelligence staff. Based upon this intelligence and knowledge of the status of friendly forces, the commander will make an assessment of the "reality" of the operational area. The "reality" of the operational area is the actual situation in the operational area including, but not limited to, the disposition of forces on both sides, casualties to personnel and equipment suffered by both sides, the weather in the area, and morale on both sides. The commander's assessment of the "reality" of the operational area is based on the input of the commander's intelligence system, sensors and lower echelon commanders in the observation portion of the cycle. Since these sources of input are imperfect and subject to manipulation by the opposing side, the commander's assessment of "reality" will invariably be something other than the actual "reality" of the operational area.



Decision. The commander will make military decisions based on the assessment of the "reality" of the operational area. The decisions made by the commander will be communicated to subordinate commanders as orders via various communications methods.

Action. Subordinate commanders at all lower echelons, the control portion of the friendly force C2 system, will cause the commander's decisions to become actions that impact the "reality" of the operational area.

Continuity of the Cycle. Since the decision cycle is a continuous process rather than a step-by-step process, all parts of the cycle are active simultaneously. The commander will be gathering information, forming appraisals, and making decisions for future operations at the same time that current orders are being executed as actions by subordinate commands. The same cycle is occurring simultaneously for all opposing sides in an operation. The same cycle is also occurring at all subordinate levels at a scope commensurate with the responsibilities of the commander at that echelon. All of these decision cycles, on all sides and at all levels will impact the "reality" of the theater of operations on a continuous basis.

Size of the Cycle. The amount of time taken to observe, orient, decide and act is represented by the length of the arc between portions of the cycle. Consistent with classic military doctrine, the commander that can gather and process information and initiate action to affect the theater of operations quickest will have a decided military advantage. Conceptually, the ability to process information into action via the cycle at a quicker pace than the opposition can be thought of as getting "inside" the adversary's decision cycle by making the friendly force cycle smaller than the opponent's.

Related Terms

command and control warfare

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-13.1 Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS

Decision support systems (i.e., reporting, intelligence, and logistics) are included within the umbrella definition of command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems. (See figure below.)

Joint Reporting System Support. Reporting includes intelligence, situation reports from maneuver forces, and logistic status. The information varies from data required for staff planning, and significant events requiring a commander's immediate attention. The principal sources of operationally significant information are the C4 systems of the combatant commands, the management and/or information systems of the Services, the support systems of the Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, and the Joint Reporting Structure (JRS). The following are some principles for reporting:

- Commanders provide the organization and procedures so that reports receive command attention when required to support decision making and control of mission execution.
- Reports adhere to standard formats when feasible to facilitate their handling through electronic systems and speed interpretation by people.
- Commanders review reporting requirements for their commands to assure that the content and frequency of reports support assigned missions without needlessly burdening subordinates.

Intelligence Support. Intelligence organizations use a variety of sensors and other information sources to collect and analyze data and produce intelligence products. C4 systems support to intelligence is normally limited to providing the communications interface and media required to move intelligence information. C4 systems support does not typically cover the collection and production of intelligence. The basis for system interoperability is the application of standard data elements and structures and information exchange standards applicable to all levels of command and to all Services and supporting agencies. The Services and agencies are responsible for fielding intelligence systems based on these standards. The following are basic intelligence system principles:



- Intelligence requirements must be incorporated in the planning and execution of military operations. Intelligence staffs should coordinate with the Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate staff to identify requirements and obtain an assessment of the intelligence communications required to support operations. Intelligence requirements generally exceed communication capabilities, therefore, communications and intelligence communities continue to develop concepts for expanding communication pipelines and imagery compression techniques.
- Each echelon of command receives organic and external intelligence support. Commanders direct requirements for assets through the Intelligence Directorate staff element.
- Defense intelligence organizations and systems operate on a shared information basis. Accordingly, within limits imposed by security, intelligence is distributed up, down, and across echelons.
- The responsibility for the application of intelligence information is shared by intelligence and operations.

Logistic Support. Accurate and timely logistic information is required for the management of critical resources. A principle source of operationally significant logistic information is the JRS. Information not routinely supplied through the JRS may be provided in response to specific queries from combatant command systems, Service logistic systems, and the DOD agencies.

Planning Support. In addition to conveying force status and intelligence information, C4 systems provide processing capabilities for planning.

Decision Support. Operational and tactical decision support systems also include maneuver, fire support and target planning, command and control warfare, air operations, and C4 systems control and management.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0	Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

DECISIVE POINTS

By correctly identifying and controlling decisive points, a commander can gain a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points are usually geographic in nature, such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, a town, or an air base. They could also include other elements such as command posts, critical boundaries, airspace, or a communications node. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are the keys to attacking protected centers of gravity.

There normally will be more decisive points in an operational area than joint force commanders can control, destroy, or neutralize with available resources. Accordingly, planners must analyze potential decisive points and determine which points enable eventual attack of the enemy's centers of gravity. The commander designates the most important decisive points as objectives and allocates resources to control, destroy, or neutralize them.

Geographic decisive points that assist commanders to gain or maintain the initiative are crucial. Controlling these points in the attack assists commanders to gain freedom of operational maneuver. Thus, they maintain the momentum of the attack and sustain the initiative. If a

defender controls such a point, it can help exhaust the attacker's momentum and facilitate the defender's counterattack.

Related Terms

centers of gravity; operational art

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

DECONTAMINATION

The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. JP 1-02

General. Decontamination is the reduction of the contamination hazard by removal or neutralization of hazardous levels of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) contamination on personnel and materiel. The primary purposes of decontamination are to stop erosion of combat power and reduce casualties that may result from inadvertent exposure or failure of protection. Initial decontamination may be performed by base personnel. Detailed decontamination may require requesting assistance from chemical units assigned to support area commanders, in accordance with joint rear area coordinator priorities. Service manuals discuss decontamination in detail. Decontamination sites should be established in the base area and decontamination supplies should be prestaged before an anticipated NBC attack.

Planning Considerations. When planning for decontamination these items should be considered:

- Identify hasty and deliberate decontamination sites.
- Designate decontamination teams and ensure that they have the necessary equipment and command and control assets.
- Plan for treatment of contaminated casualties.
- Plan for the marking and reporting of contaminated areas and terrain decontamination.
- Plan for employment of detection alarms.
- Conduct necessary NBC training.
- Plan for disposal of the waste products of decontamination operations.

The management and treatment of contaminated casualties will vary with the tactical situation and the nature of the contaminant. Each medical unit must have a plan that can be put into effect immediately. Decentralization is necessary — casualties must not be forced to wait at a central point for decontamination. All medical units should have comparable sets of medical items and decontamination equipment for treatment of contaminated patients originating in their area. Decontamination of the patients serves two purposes: it prevents the patient's system from absorbing additional contaminants, and it protects medical personnel treating the patient and other patients from contamination.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-10.1 JTTP for Base Defense
JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Department of Defense long-haul voice, data, and record traffic system which includes the Defense Data Network, Defense Satellite Communications System, and Defense Switched Network. Also called DCS. JP 1-02

The Defense Communications System (DCS) is a composite of specific Department of Defense (DOD) communications systems and networks under the managerial control and operational directions of Defense Information Systems Agency. DCS provides the long-haul, point-to-point, and switched network telecommunications services needed to satisfy command and control requirements of DOD and those civil agencies directly concerned with national security or other critical emergency requirements.

Related Terms

Defense Data Network; Defense Switched Network

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07.4 Joint Counterdrug Operations

DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS NETWORK

General. The Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) is a composite of certain Department of Defense (DOD) information systems and networks under the management control and command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems operational direction of Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). The DISN is a significant effort that has been undertaken by DOD to transform the way information is developed, used, and shared. This includes modifications to the existing Defense Communications System (DCS) to establish a defense information infrastructure, the Corporate Information Management initiative, programs to implement the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Command, Control, Communications, Computers, And Intelligence For The Warrior concept, and the integration of advanced technology demonstrations conducted under the global grid initiative. DISN will ultimately subsume or replace most Service- and Agency-unique stovepipe networks and systems.

Objective. The existing DCS provides the long haul, point-to-point, and switched network telecommunications needed to satisfy the command and control (C2) requirements of DOD and civil agencies directly concerned with national security or other critical emergency requirements. DCS facilities are employed in support of C2; operations; intelligence; weather; logistic; and administrative functions. The objective of the DCS is to organize the complex of DOD communications networks, equipment, control centers, and resources to provide an effective, responsive, survivable worldwide communications system. The system provides maximum security consistent with threat, cost effectiveness, and acceptable risk factors and makes use of any DCS circuitry available at a given time for fulfilling the priority needs of the users.

Architecture. The DISN architecture (see figure below) prescribes a global network integrating existing DCS assets; military satellite communications; commercial satellite communications initiatives; leased telecommunications services; as well as the dedicated worldwide enterprise-level telecommunications infrastructure that provides the interoperable transport for the end-to-end transfer of information in support of military operations.



Command Relationships. Directors of DISA field organizations and Service component commanders will be responsive to the operational needs of the combatant commanders, who exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over the Service component operating elements of the DISN. This authority is normally exercised through the Service component commanders.

In accordance with DOD Directive 5105.19, "Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)," DISA field organizations, under the command of the Director, DISA, exercise operational direction (the authoritative direction necessary to ensure the effective operation of the DISN) over the DISN operating elements.

If a major emergency necessitates the use of all available forces, the combatant commanders have COCOM over the Service component operating elements of the DISN. In exercising this authority, the combatant commanders will be cognizant of DISN support to the National Command Authorities, DOD agencies, and other combatant commanders and will preserve DISN integrity and standards to the maximum possible extent.

Operating elements of the DISN are subject to authoritative direction from different sources. To avoid conflicting direction, the combatant commanders will normally express their DISN operational requirements to the senior DISN field organization serving their areas of responsibility.

Planning DISN and Non-DISN (Tactical) C4 Systems Interfaces. Requirements for interface between the DISN and tactical C4 systems occur at various organizational levels and include DISN switched networks, C2 and support networks, and transmission capabilities ranging from a few circuits to many.

The combatant commanders designate where, when, and how DISN and non-DISN C4 systems interface. In the preparation of plans, commanders should ensure that these points, and those facilities for which interface capability is required, are identified and that operational interface requirements are established. Normally, interface will occur at the headquarters of the commanders of component commands, at the headquarters of other elements directly controlled by the combatant commander, or at designated area communications nodes. Additional interface points may be specified by the CJCS.

When the combatant commander determines that the extension of the DISN is appropriate, the combatant commander may designate certain operational tactical C4 facilities to replace DISN facilities or make other appropriate temporary arrangements until DISN facilities can be provided.

Related Terms

command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency has several responsibilities including the following:

- Ensures that expeditious, tailored, all-source intelligence collection, production, and dissemination support is provided to Department of Defense (DOD) entities. This support includes selected intelligence planning, programming, and policy in support of conventional, special, and nuclear operations; collection and collection management support; and analysis for strategic warning, order of battle, threat, scientific and technical, current, estimative, counterintelligence, and target intelligence.
- Establishes standards of capability and interoperability for Joint and Service intelligence activities.
- Responsible for coordinating planning and programming of intelligence resources, including those for selected automated data processing systems, telecommunications, and survivability.
- Reviews proposed DOD intelligence programs to ensure interoperability and satisfaction of requirements.

- Provides DOD management of collection activities (e.g., human, imagery, and measurement and signature intelligence).
- Plans and develops implementing instructions for provision of intelligence support to joint organizations across the range of military operations with emphasis on special operations, crisis response, and war.
- When authorized during crises and wartime, communicates directly with any military intelligence entity for the purpose of assembling, validating, and prioritizing intelligence collection and production requirements; tasking collection assets; processing intelligence and information; disseminating intelligence data; and ensuring that intelligence is also provided through the chain of command.
- Ensures that intelligence entities of combatant commands and subordinate joint forces are fully informed regarding the actual all-source national and Service unique intelligence capabilities to prevent unnecessary duplicative tasking of intelligence resources and to ensure that they are aware of when new capabilities are projected to become available for planning or operational support.
- Identifies critical intelligence needs of departmental and national users that must be satisfied in a timely manner by operational forces.
- Provides intelligence support for joint exercises.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE

This document, issued by the Secretary of Defense, provides firm guidance in the form of goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal constraints, for the development of the Program Objective Memorandums by the Military Departments and Defense agencies. Also called DPG. JP 1-02

The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) furnishes the Secretary of Defense's programming and fiscal guidance to the Military Departments for development of department Program Objective Memorandums for the defense planning period. The DPG includes major planning issues and decisions, strategy and policy, strategic elements, the Secretary's program planning objectives, the Defense Planning Estimate, the Illustrative Planning Scenarios, and a series of studies. The DPG is a major link between Joint Strategic Planning System and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.

Related Terms

Joint Strategic Planning System

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

The action by which a commander assigns part of his or her authority commensurate with the assigned task to a subordinate commander. While ultimate responsibility cannot be relinquished, delegation of authority carries with it the imposition of a measure of responsibility. The extent of the authority delegated must be clearly stated. JP 1-02

The delegation of authority commensurate with responsibility is a necessary part of building trust and teamwork. Oversupervision disrupts teamwork. Military history demonstrates that delegation unleashes the best efforts and greatest initiative among all members of military teams. Delegation is especially important in joint warfare where Service expertise is the essential building block.

"I built trust among my components because I trusted them....If you want true jointness, a CINC should not dabble in the details of component business."

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA Commander, US Central Command during Operation DESERT STORM

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

DELIBERATE PLANNING

1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. JP 1-02

Deliberate planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and using forces and resources apportioned for deliberate planning by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. Deliberate planning is conducted principally in peacetime to develop joint operation plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents. It is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense (DOD) planning systems and is performed in accordance with formally established procedures. Deliberate planning is a highly structured process that engages the commanders and staffs of the entire Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) in the methodical development of fully coordinated, complex planning for all contingencies and the transition to and from war. Plans developed during deliberate

planning provide a foundation for and ease the transition to crisis resolution. Work performed during the deliberate planning process allows the JPEC to develop the processes, procedures, and planning expertise that are critically needed during crisis action planning.

"In times of peace the general staff should plan for all contingencies of war. Its archives should contain the historical details of the past and all statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and papers for the present and future."

Jomini: Precis de l' Art de la Guerre, 1838

The process for joint operation planning begins when a requirement is identified and continues until the requirement no longer exists. Deliberate planning is performed in a continuous cycle that complements and supports other DOD planning cycles. A new deliberate plan usually begins with the publication of a change to the JSCP. The deliberate planning cycle usually begins with the publication of a new JSCP. In coordination with the JPEC, the Joint Staff develops and issues a planning schedule that coordinates plan development activities and established submission dates for joint operation plans (OPLANs). As seen in the first figure below, deliberate planning is accomplished in five phases: initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and supporting plans.

Initiation. Planning tasks are assigned to supported commanders, forces and resources are apportioned, and planning guidance is issued during this phase. The JSCP links the Joint Strategic Planning System to joint operation planning, identifies broad scenarios for plan development, specifies the type of plan required (i.e., OPLANs, OPLANs in concept format (with or without time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) or functional plans) and provides additional planning guidance as necessary. A combatant commander may also initiate deliberate planning by preparing plans not specifically assigned but considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities.

Concept Development. The concept development phase of deliberate planning is accomplished by the supported commander responsible for developing the plan. Concept development follows six steps: mission analysis, planning guidance development, staff estimates, commander's estimate, commander of a combatant command's (CINC's) Strategic Concept, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) review. (See second figure below.) The assigned task is analyzed, a mission statement is developed, and planning guidance is prepared and issued to the staff as well as subordinate and supporting commands in step one. During step two, alternative course of actions (COAs) are developed and distributed for staff estimates of supportability to be completed in step three. In step four, alternative COAs are war-gamed, analyzed, and compared to produce a commander's estimate containing the commander's decision on the preferred COA. The selected COA is then expanded into the CINC's Strategic Concept that is submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval. When approved, the CINC's Strategic Concept provides the basis for plan development.

Plan Development. A CJCS-approved concept of operations is expanded into a complete OPLAN during the plan development phase of deliberate planning. Plan development is accomplished by a designated supported commander, normally a combatant commander, with the assistance of supporting and subordinate commanders. The supported commander guides the plan development process by publishing a Letter of Instruction (LOI) to coordinate the activities of the commands and agencies involved. Eight steps can be identified in the plan development phase as shown in the third figure below. These eight steps provide a logical planning structure within which the forces and resources required to execute the



concept of operations are progressively identified, sequenced, and coupled with transportation capabilities to produce a feasible OPLAN. This phase of deliberate planning is heavily dependent on the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) automated data processing to produce the TPFDD.

One of the most time-consuming and intensively managed aspects of plan development is constructing the OPLAN TPFDD. A TPFDD is the computer-supported data base portion of an OPLAN, necessary to complete Appendix 1 to Annex A of the OPLAN. (See third figure below.) The supported commander provides TPFDD development guidance and milestones to the JPEC through a TPFDD LOI.

TPFDD Refinement. TPFDD development involves the sequential development and refinement of forces, logistics, and transportation data in a process collectively termed TPFDD refinement. A TPFDD normally contains assigned, augmentation, and supporting forces



with accompanying supplies. As TPFDD refinement progresses, an estimate of resupply and personnel requirements to sustain the force based on consumption factors, computer modeling, and past experience is added. In addition, a fully refined TPFDD must be made transportation feasible. Therefore, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) plays a key role in the refinement process by hosting and coordinating refinement conferences and assessing transportation feasibility.

Forces refinement is conducted in coordination with supported and supporting commanders, Services, the Joint Staff and other supporting agencies to confirm that forces are sourced and tailored within JSCP guidance and to assess the adequacy of the combat support and combat service support sourced by the Services. USTRANSCOM provides sealift and airlift capability estimates based on lift apportionment throughout the process to ensure transportation feasibility.



Logistic refinement is conducted primarily by the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and Service component commanders under the overall direction of the supported commander. Logistic refinement confirms the sourcing of logistic requirements in accordance with JSCP guidance and assesses the adequacy of resources provided through support planning. USTRANSCOM coordinates on logistic planning matters and hosts conferences dedicated to logistic planning and refinement.

Transportation refinement simulates the planned movement resources to ensure that the plan is transportation feasible. USTRANSCOM uses computer simulation to determine



transportation feasibility. In turn, the supported commander adjusts TPFDD requirements as necessary to remain within lift capability.

Following TPFDD refinement, the supported commander completes the documentation of the plan and coordinates distribution of the TPFDD within the JOPES network as appropriate. The supported CINC then submits the OPLAN with the TPFDD file to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.

At the end of the OPLAN development cycle, or biennially during periods of extended maintenance cycles, the Joint Staff will host a sustainability conference to review current LSA issues. The review will convert any operational logistic deficiencies into programming requirements.

Plan Review. In the plan review phase of deliberate planning, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducts a final review of OPLANs submitted by the supported commander. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, and Defense agencies, assesses and validates joint OPLANs prepared by supported commanders using the criteria of adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and compliance with joint doctrine. It is a formal process that evaluates the entire plan, including TPFDD and other computer-supported data files, to determine whether taskings have been met and whether resources have been used effectively within the constraints of JSCP apportionment guidance. The review also identifies unresolved shortfalls in force and resource capabilities. Upon completion of the review, the supported commander is informed that the plan is approved or disapproved for reasons stated. Plans that contain critical shortfalls that are beyond the supported commander's ability to resolve will be approved with these short-falls identified. In such cases, the supported commander will be provided with guidance regarding specific actions planned or programmed to redress the shortfalls. Approved plans remain so until superseded or canceled. Upon notification that a plan has been approved, the supported commander incorporates CJCS-directed changes and directs the completion of supporting plans by supporting and subordinate commanders.

Supporting Plans. During this final phase of the deliberate planning process, the supported commander directs the completion and submission of supporting plans to the CJCS-approved OPLAN. These plans focus on the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces and resources in support of the concept described in the supported commander's approved plan. Supporting plans are developed concurrently with operation plans and are required to be submitted to the supported commander within 60 days of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's plan approval. The plans are developed by component commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, supporting commanders, and other agencies as directed by the supported commander. The review and approval of supporting plans is the responsibility of the commander they support. However, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be requested to resolve critical issues that arise during the review of supporting plans, and the Joint Staff may coordinate the review of any supporting plans on behalf of the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should circumstances so warrant. Employment planning is normally accomplished by the subordinate commands that will direct the forces if the plan is executed. It may be delayed when the politico-military situation cannot be clearly forecast or it may be excluded from supporting plans if employment is to be planned and executed within an alliance or treaty framework.

Related Terms

crisis action planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

DEMOBILIZATION

The process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. JP 1-02

General. Demobilization is the process of transitioning from a crisis situation or from a wartime military establishment and defense-based economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. It involves more than releasing personnel from active duty, deactivating units, and reorganizing the reserve component (RC). Although these activities drive the process, capability or capacity in the other resource areas must be reduced and reorganized at the same time. As in mobilization, activities in each resource area during demobilization will affect each of the others. For this reason, close coordination between resource area proponents is just as important during demobilization as it is during mobilization.

From a national perspective, the results of a successful demobilization process should put the US in a position to respond to future challenges to our national security. Policies would be established to regulate the pace of demobilization and retain the military capability required to ensure postconflict national security commitments during the transition to a peacetime environment. The armed forces would eventually be returned to their precrisis structure by releasing RC units from active duty. The size of the total force, as well as the size of the active component (AC), RC, and civilian components could also be changed as a result of the crisis, but any such force structure changes are not inherent to the demobilization process. Industrial base and other civil sector resources mobilized during the conflict would be released to fuel the postconflict national economy.

The scope of demobilization will vary according to the extent of the preceding mobilization. The scope of mobilization can range from relatively brief use of a few volunteer reservists to a protracted force and resource expansion well beyond the original peacetime levels. (See figure below.) Demobilization of volunteers following Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada and the massive demobilization following World War II are examples of the range of the demobilization activities. Demobilization planners and decision makers, therefore, could be challenged anywhere within these extremes. The demobilization guidelines provided below provide guidance for planners throughout this spectrum.

From a joint military perspective, demobilization plans should reflect the postconflict missions of supported commanders and be synchronized with plans for battlefield recovery and redeployment operations. Department of Defense (DOD) policies for the release of reservists and RC units ordered to active duty should first reflect military requirements and then considerations of equity and fairness for military personnel and their families. The demobilization personnel management programs of the Military Departments will be challenged to facilitate the return of Service members and their families to civilian life and will need to provide transition assistance as members reenter an economy that could be depressed because of economic conditions brought on by the crisis. National Guard and Reserve units and members ordered to active duty to augment the AC will, consistent with operational requirements, receive priority for redeployment. They will be released from active duty as expeditiously as possible.

Demobilization Planning Guidelines. Study of the demobilizations following the two World Wars and the Gulf War provide valuable lessons for today's demobilization planners and have been distilled into the following guidelines for demobilization planning and execution. (See second figure below.)



DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING GUIDELINES

Mission First

Begin Planning Early

Understand Possible Consequences

Coordinate and Communicate Plans and Policies

Mission First. Demobilization plans must support the postconflict mission as it evolves. The supported commander's immediate postwar priorities should come first. As the transition to a peacetime state proceeds, long-range national security objectives should drive demobilization activities to ensure the armed forces are prepared for the next crisis.

Begin Planning Early. Ideally, demobilization planning should begin soon after mobilization commences.

Understand Possible Consequences. The proposed demobilization policies should include consideration of the following: joint force readiness; the health of the national economy; morale of and benefits for Service members and DOD civilian employees and their families.

Coordinate and Communicate Plans and Policies. The demobilization policies and procedures that worked best in the past were those that had been developed and coordinated by interested personnel and agencies both within and outside the DOD. Public information programs that explained demobilization policies helped gain and maintain public support.

Planning Considerations. Demobilizing the armed forces could be a relatively straightforward return of mobilized RC units and individuals to their former status. It could also be a broader process including measures such as deactivation of units, rapid discharge of individuals, and a major reorganization of the RC, which might be necessary after a long war. Similarly, demobilization of the defense industry could range from an almost total reconversion of a defense-oriented industrial base to a simple reduction in the output of a few providers who surged production to meet the near-term demands of a short-lived crisis. (See figure below.)

Recovery activities must also be planned along with demobilization. These include activities for restoring force readiness and controlling the rate of industrial base conversion to avoid disrupting the national economy. As manpower is being released from the Services and industrial production is being cut back, the Services must retain or replace skilled manpower required to restore readiness and replenish war reserves and other stocks to be prepared for the next crisis.

Demobilization planning is accomplished at two levels. At the national level, National Command Authorities (NCA) must decide on the rate of demobilization and the size and composition of the postconflict force structure and its resource base. These national-level decisions drive demobilization planning and resource requests at the theater and supporting levels. They also guide the postconflict activities of the supported and supporting commanders.

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOBILIZATION ACTIONS IN RESOURCE AREAS

RESOURCE AREA	ACTION
Transportation	Strategic airlift and sealift assets are deactivated or returned to the Reserve Component or to the private sector.
Facilities	Buildings are closed, sold, or returned to the private sector or host nation. Staffing is reduced. Contracts for services and utilities are reduced or terminated.
Industrial Base	Contracts are reduced in scope or terminated. Production capacity is laid-away or converted to commercial use.
Training Base	Capacity is reduced by closing training centers or reducing staffs and other resources to provide capacity based on future demands.
Health Service Support	Hospital resources and staffs provided by the National Disaster Medical System or the DVA-DOD Contingency Plan are released when no longer required. Medical force structure is deactivated or returned to a reserve status. Contracts with nongovernment and host-nation providers are terminated.
Communications Support	National and joint assets are redeployed. Leased capacity and equipment from commercial sources are reduced in scope or terminated.
Host-Nation Support	Agreements and contracts with host governments or commercial providers are renegotiated or terminated.
Environment	Military Departments and Defense agencies act to meet environmental standards and regulations with cleanup and other appropriate activities.
Legal Authorities	The President informs the Congress when legal authorities invoked for the crisis are no longer needed and are revoked or rescinded.
Funding	Funding required for demobilization and recovery activities is provided in accordance with established peacetime procedures.

The key to military demobilization is the supported commander. The commander's mission and requirements should take precedence over all others. Other general planning factors should include the following:

- The situation and requirements in other theaters, the NCA, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should establish a priority of support.
- Future missions in the theater.
- Availability of strategic lift for redeployment.
- Continental US reception and processing capacities for manpower and materiel.

Related Terms

mobilization

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

DENTAL SERVICES SUPPORT

General. The Health Service Support (HSS) dental service is a major contributor to maintaining unit fighting strength. Joint operation planning must include consideration of the various roles of dental services. Historical review indicates that dental problems cause as much as eight percent of a unit's noncombat casualty losses.

The planning process includes an evaluation of the size and anticipated duration of the operation, along with the levels of dental care, as shown in the figure below, required throughout the operation.

Levels of Dental Care

- Level I — Emergency Dental Care. Austere treatment of dental emergencies that immediately return troops to duty. This minimal level of care does not require dental facilities.
- Level II — Sustaining Dental Care. Expedient dental treatment that intercepts potential emergencies to minimize troop loss to units in combat operations. This level of care is essential to the preservation of fighting strength early in the conflict, which is usually

provided in combat service support areas adjacent to Echelon II medical support. Planners can include dental personnel to augment medical units during periods of mass casualty (MASCALs) reception.

- Level III — Maintaining Dental Care. Definitive treatment to prevent and treat dental and oral conditions early enough to preserve satisfactory oral health. This level of care is necessary when planning HSS for lengthy military operations.
- Level IV — Comprehensive Care. Treatment to restore an individual to optimal oral health, functions, and esthetics. Comprehensive dental care may be achieved incidental to maintaining, sustaining, and providing emergency care in individuals whose oral condition is healthy enough to be addressed by the levels of care provided. This level of care is usually reserved for HSS plans that anticipate an extensive period of reception and training in theater. The scope of facilities needed to provide this level of detail support can equal that of Echelon III medical facilities.

Deliberate planning for dental services must include the potential for augmenting the medical effort during MASCALs. Joint planning requires a statement specifically excluding dental services, if deemed appropriate. Joint operations of limited size or duration may limit dental services to predeployment screening, which eliminates planning for deployment of dental personnel and equipment.

Related Terms

health service support

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MASTER MOBILIZATION GUIDE

Basic guidance to direct and coordinate mobilization planning within the Department of Defense (DOD) is contained in the DOD Master Mobilization Guide (MMG), which implements DOD responsibilities under the National Security Council national security emergency preparedness policy. The MMG is the first level of mobilization planning. It identifies mobilization responsibilities for DOD components and describes the tasks to be performed in peacetime and at the time of mobilization. It provides a common foundation for the preparation of detailed mobilization plans by the Joint Staff, Military Departments, and Defense agencies.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

Operational planning directed toward the movement of forces and sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area for conducting the joint operations contemplated in a given plan. Encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging areas, and holding areas. JP 1-02

Deployment planning is the responsibility of the supported combatant commanders in close coordination with the US Transportation Command. Deployment planning is planning to move forces and their sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area to conduct joint operations outlined in a given plan. It involves planning for the continental United States, intertheater (strategic), and intratheater movement of forces and the required resources to sustain them. Strategic deployment planning focuses on the intertheater movement of forces and resources using national, allied and coalition strategic deployment capabilities.

Deployment planning is more deliberate and methodical than employment planning and lends itself better to automated data processing support. Logistic planners must avoid focusing solely on the deployment requirements at the expense of sustaining the employment concept of the campaign. Detailed logistic planning for employment is equally important and should neither be neglected nor delayed until deployment plans are completed. Only by thorough and concurrent consideration of both deployment and employment facets of the campaign or operation will planners be able to construct adequate logistic plans.

Related Terms

employment planning; joint operation planning; redeployment planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

DETERRENCE

The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. JP 1-02

The political leadership of an opposing nation is the central objective of deterrence, because that is where the ultimate decision to use military force lies. Deterrence of a large-scale attack (either weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or conventional) requires that US forces and command and control systems be viewed by enemy leadership as capable of inflicting such damage upon their military forces and means of support, or upon their country, as to effectively deny them the military option. Deterrence of the employment of enemy WMD, whether it be nuclear, biological, or chemical, requires that the enemy leadership believes the US has both the ability and will to respond promptly and with selective responses that are credible (commensurate with the scale or scope of enemy attacks and the nature of US interests at stake) and militarily effective. Any deterrence assumes an opposing nation's political leadership will act according to the logic of national self-interest, although this self-interest will be viewed through differing cultural perspectives and the dictates of given situations.

Although nations possessing WMD have largely refrained from using them, their continuing proliferation along with the means to deliver them increases the possibility that someday a nation may, through miscalculation or by deliberate choice, employ those weapons. This assumption does not rule out the possibility that an opponent may be willing to risk destruction or disproportionate losses in following a course of action based on perceived necessity, whether rational or not in a totally objective sense. In such cases, deterrence, even based on the threat of massive destruction, may fail.

Deterrence is founded in real force capabilities and the national determination to use those forces if necessary. To have a credible effect on an adversary, US military forces must be capable of achieving US national objectives throughout the range of military operations.

Capabilities must range from nation building or civil-military operations through direct denial of military objectives and conventional defeat of enemy forces to the full-scale destruction of enemy warmaking and economic infrastructures, while minimizing the enemy's ability to retaliate. These capabilities require maintaining a diverse mix of conventional forces capable of high-intensity, sustained, and coordinated air, land, sea, and special operations; survivable and capable nuclear forces; and the command, control, communications, and computer systems required to control these forces. The mix of these forces must be capable of holding at risk those assets most valued by enemy leaders and providing a range of options in response to attack. It is possible, however, that an adversary may misperceive or purposefully ignore a credible threat. Therefore, should deterrence fail, forces of all types (both conventional and nuclear) must be structured, deployed, and ready to provide a variety of options designed to control escalation and terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the US and its allies.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-12 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations

DIMENSIONAL SUPERIORITY

Joint force commanders (JFCs) will normally seek to secure air and maritime superiority early in the conduct of joint operations. Air and maritime superiority enable and enhance joint operations in all dimensions. Although air and maritime superiority are not ends in themselves, history shows that control of the sea and/or the air has been a pivotal wartime factor. World War II's Operation POINT BLANK established air superiority, which was considered a prerequisite for Operation OVERLORD. The Navy component commander or joint force maritime component commander is normally the supported commander for sea control operations, and the joint force air component commander is normally the supported commander for counterair operations.

Superiority battles are not limited to the air and maritime environments. JFCs seek to achieve superiority immediately in command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence — space control is a necessary precursor to this superiority. They seek to lay open the enemy's intentions, capabilities, and actions to observation and assessment, while simultaneously depriving the enemy of similar information about the friendly force and deceiving the enemy as to the veracity of the information obtained about the friendly force.

As another example of seeking early superiority before close combat, land commanders may seek to first achieve counterbattery or indirect fire superiority, thereby enhancing protection of their forces. Additionally, JFCs can seek to achieve a mobility differential by selectively attacking key enemy forces and transportation networks to degrade enemy maneuver.

Related Terms

operational art

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

DIRECT ACTION

Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage. Also called DA. JP 1-02

In the conduct of direct action (DA) operations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace munitions and other devices; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage.

DA operations are normally limited in scope and duration and usually incorporate a planned withdrawal from the immediate objective area. Special operation forces (SOF) may conduct these missions unilaterally or in support of conventional operations. DA operations are designed to achieve specific, well-defined, and often time-sensitive results of strategic, operational, or critical tactical significance. They frequently occur beyond the reach of tactical weapon systems and selective strike capabilities of conventional forces. Operations typically involve attack on critical targets (materiel or personnel); interdiction of critical lines of communications or other target systems; location, capture, or recovery of designated personnel or materiel; and seizure, destruction, or neutralization of critical facilities in support of conventional forces or in advance of their arrival. (See figure below.)

DA is conducted by individuals and small units from team to multibattalion size. Although normally thought of in terms of ground or maritime close-combat type operations, they also include standoff attacks by weapon systems either delivered or directed by SOF. Close combat tactics and techniques are employed when the target and mission require precise or discriminate application of force beyond the capability of other forces and weapon systems or when the mission requires recovery or capture of personnel or equipment. Standoff attacks are conducted in support of close combat actions or independently when the target can be sufficiently damaged or destroyed without the commitment of close-combat type forces.

The methods for planning and conducting DA may be either deliberate or quick response. Deliberately planned missions are preferred. They capitalize on detailed intelligence, thorough planning, and meticulous rehearsal to enhance the probability of mission accomplishment. A combination of time available, nature of the target, and the operational environment are keys to determining if a mission can be prosecuted effectively. In response to crises, time-sensitive missions are conducted against perishable or fleeting target or to capitalize on narrow windows of enemy vulnerability. Because of limited planning and rehearsal time and usually incomplete intelligence due to significant time constraints, the probability of mission success is generally less than that for deliberate operations.

DA missions to locate, recover, and restore to friendly control persons held captive, isolated, or threatened in sensitive, denied, or contested areas may be conducted when the priority of the operation is sufficiently high to warrant planning and conducting a special operation. Special operations (SO) recovery missions differ from Service combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations. To respond in minimum time, Service CSAR forces usually rely on dedicated assets and established command and control nets that are often on alert. However,



SOF recovery missions are often characterized by detailed planning, rehearsal, and thorough intelligence analysis. They routinely employ unconventional tactics and techniques, clandestine search, indigenous assistance, and the frequent use of ground combat elements.

DA missions may be conducted independently or within the context of larger conventional or unconventional operations or campaigns. They are conducted by Army special forces, Ranger, and Special Operations Aviation units; by Navy sea-air-land teams, special boat unit, and submerged delivery vehicle teams; and by Air Force SO gunships, vertical lift and fixed-wing insertion and/or extraction aircraft, and special tactics units.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

DIRECT ATTACK OF ENEMY STRATEGIC CENTERS OF GRAVITY

As part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy centers of gravity. Where possible, specific operations may be conducted to directly attack strategic centers of gravity by air, missile, special operations, and other deep-ranging capabilities. When air operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to directly attack enemy strategic centers of gravity or to conduct air superiority operations, joint force commanders will normally task joint force air component commanders, as supported commanders, to conduct such operations.

There are several purposes to these attacks. They may in themselves be decisive. If they are not, they begin the offensive operation throughout the enemy's depth that can cause paralysis and destroy cohesion.

Related Terms

operational art

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY FOR LOGISTICS

"I don't know what the hell this "logistics" is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it."

Fleet Admiral E.J. King: To a staff officer, 1942

General. Commanders of combatant commands may exercise directive authority for logistics (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability). The exercise of directive authority for logistics by a combatant commander includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the following: effective execution of approved operation plans; effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands.

A combatant commander's directive authority does not discontinue Service responsibility for logistic support, discourage coordination by consultation and agreement, or disrupt effective procedures, efficient utilization of facilities, or organization.

Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments and Services continue to have responsibility for the logistic and administrative support of Service forces assigned or attached to joint commands, subject to the following guidance:

- Under peacetime conditions, the scope of the logistic and administrative authority exercised by the commander of a combatant command will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, Department of Defense policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where these factors preclude execution of a combatant commander's directive by component commanders, the comments and recommendations of the combatant commander, together with the comments of the component commander concerned, will normally be referred to the appropriate Military Department for consideration. If the matter is not resolved in a timely manner with the appropriate Military Department, it will be referred by the combatant commander, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.
- Under crisis action, wartime conditions or where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic and administrative authority of combatant commanders enable them to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions. Joint logistic doctrine and policy developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establishes wartime logistic support guidance that will assist the combatant commander in conducting successful joint operations.

- A combatant commander will exercise approval authority over Service logistic programs (base adjustments, force beddowns, and other aspects as appropriate) within the command's area of responsibility that will have significant effects on operational capability or sustainability. When the combatant commander does not concur with a proposed Service logistic program action and coordination between the combatant commander and the Chief of the Service fails to result in an arrangement suitable to all parties, the combatant commander may forward the issue through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

Related Terms

combatant command (command authority)

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED

That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Also called DIRLAUTH. JP 1-02

Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH) is that authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting DIRLAUTH informed. DIRLAUTH is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

Related Terms

administrative control; combatant command (command authority); coordinating authority; operational control; tactical control

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

DIRECTOR OF MOBILITY FORCES

A Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) may be established to assist in the coordination of airlift issues in the theater. The DIRMOBFOR will normally be a senior officer who is familiar with the area of responsibility/joint operations area and possesses an extensive background in airlift operations. The DIRMOBFOR may be sourced from the theater's organizations or be nominated from US Transportation Command or US Atlantic Command. When established, the DIRMOBFOR serves as the designated agent for all airlift issues. The DIRMOBFOR exercises coordinating authority between the airlift control center, air mobility element (AME), (or tactical air command center, if no AME is deployed), joint movement center, and the air operations center in order to expedite the resolution of airlift problems. The DIRMOBFOR's duties and authority will be as directed by the Air Force

component commander or joint force air component commander to satisfy the objectives of the joint force commander.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

4-01.1 JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations

DIRECT SUPPORT

A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force's request for assistance. JP 1-02

See support.

DIRECT SUPPORT AIR CAPABILITIES/FORCES

Only the joint force commander (JFC) has the authority to reassign, redirect, or reallocate a component's direct support air capabilities/forces. When a component does not have the organic air capabilities/forces to support their assigned mission, the joint force air component commander or JFC will task available joint air capabilities/forces (through the joint air tasking order (ATO)) based on the JFC's air apportionment decision. An understanding of what defines component direct support air capabilities/forces and joint air capabilities/forces is necessary. Component direct support air capabilities/forces are those air capabilities/forces organic to a component that are used by the component to accomplish its assigned mission. When appropriate, they appear on the joint ATO for coordination and deconfliction purposes.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

DISASTER RELIEF

A significant number of humanitarian assistance programs involve disaster relief operations. The military can provide assistance to help ease the effects of natural disasters and manmade events. Characteristics of Disaster Relief Assistance are as follows:

- Health service support (HSS) assistance requires rapid assessment of the damage caused by the disaster and a rapid tailoring of an HSS element to meet the needs of the affected populace. The HSS element should have a wide range of specialties available to conduct an accurate assessment.
- Preventive medicine plays a key role in the relief effort since natural disasters can disrupt the ecological balance, causing potential disease outbreaks. Measures to ensure sanitation and disease vector control must be planned for and implemented as soon as possible.
- The treatment rendered may be austere and possibly provided in rudimentary facilities.
- The HSS response must be able to reach the disaster site rapidly, with the right mix of specialties, and be coordinated with concerned agencies. Coordination should be established, as appropriate, with the Director of Military Support; Federal Emergency Management Agency; state and local office of emergency services; emergency medical systems; local US military medical treatment facilities and Department of Veterans Affairs

medical treatment facilities (including their role as coordinators of national disaster medical systems); and the Department of Health and Human Service's Public Health Service.

Related Terms

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

DISCIPLINE

General. The joint force commander (JFC) is responsible for the discipline and administration of military personnel assigned to the joint organization. In addition to the administration and disciplinary authority exercised by subordinate JFCs, a combatant commander may prescribe procedures by which the senior officer of a Service assigned to the headquarters element of a joint organization may exercise administrative and nonjudicial punishment authority over personnel of the same Service assigned to the same joint organization.

Each Service component commander in a combatant command is primarily responsible for the internal administration and discipline of that Service's component forces, subject to Service regulations and directives established by the combatant commander. The JFC exercises disciplinary authority vested in the JFC by law, Service regulations, and superior authority in the chain of command.

The JFC should normally exercise administrative and disciplinary authority through the Service component commanders to the extent practicable. When this is impracticable, the JFC may establish joint agencies responsible directly to the JFC to advise or make recommendations on matters placed within their jurisdiction or, if necessary, to carry out the directives of a superior authority. A joint military police force is an example of such an agency.

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The UCMJ provides the basic law for discipline of the armed forces. The Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), US (as amended), prescribes the rules and procedures governing military justice. Pursuant to the authority vested in the President under article 22(a), UCMJ, and in Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) 201(e)(2)(a) of the MCM, 1984, combatant commanders are given courts-martial jurisdiction over members of any of the armed forces. Pursuant to article 23(a)(6), UCMJ, subordinate JFCs of a detached command or unit have special courts-martial convening authority. Under RCM 201(e)(2)(c), combatant commanders may expressly authorize subordinate JFCs who are authorized to convene special and summary courts-martial to convene such courts-martial for the trial of members of other armed forces.

Rules and regulations implementing the UCMJ and MCM are, for the most part, of single-Service origin. In a joint force, however, the JFC should publish rules and regulations that establish uniform policies applicable to all Services' personnel within the joint organization where appropriate. For example, joint rules and regulations should normally be published to cover hours and areas authorized for liberty, apprehension of Service personnel, black market and currency control regulations, and other matters that the JFC deems appropriate.

Establishment of Joint Military Police. The JFC may establish joint police agencies to ensure consistent enforcement of military discipline within the joint commander's area of responsibility or joint operations area. Joint police agencies will normally include members of all Services constituting the joint force. Members of the joint police agency will be

authorized to apprehend personnel of any Service anywhere within the JFC's area of responsibility/joint operations area, with due regard to host-nation law and applicable status-of-forces agreements. Establishing a joint police agency does not relieve the Service component commander of responsibility for enforcing discipline on the military reservation or within the military jurisdiction under the component's exclusive control. Responsibility for areas of overlapping disciplinary authority will be specified by the JFC.

Action of Joint Military Police. An offender apprehended by joint (or other than own Service) military police (or shore patrol) will be turned over promptly to the offender's commanding officer, or prompt notice of custody will be sent to the offender's unit or Service authority.

Trial and Punishment.

Convening Courts-Martial. General courts-martial may be convened by the commander of a combatant command. An accused may be tried by a court-martial convened by a member of a different Military Service when the court-martial is convened by a JFC who has been specifically empowered by statute, the President, the Secretary of Defense, or a superior commander under the provisions of the RCM, 201(e)(2) of the MCM, to refer such cases for trial by courts-martial.

Nonjudicial Punishment. The JFC may impose nonjudicial punishment upon any military personnel of the command, unless such authority is limited or withheld by a superior commander. The JFC will use the regulations of the offender's Service when conducting nonjudicial punishment proceedings, including punishment, suspension, mitigation, and filing. Except as noted below, appeals and other actions involving review of nonjudicial punishment imposed by a JFC will follow the appropriate regulations of the offender's Service. When the combatant commander personally imposes nonjudicial punishment, or is otherwise disqualified from being the appellate authority, appeals will be forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for appropriate action by the Secretary of Defense or his designee. Collateral decisions and processing (e.g., personnel and finance actions and unfavorable notations in selection records and personnel files) will be handled in Service channels.

Confinement. Personnel of any Service may be confined in the facilities of any of the Services while awaiting trial or the results of a trial if confinement is otherwise authorized by law.

Execution of Punishment. Execution of any punishment adjudged or imposed within any Service may be carried out by another Service under regulations provided by the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

DISCIPLINED OPERATIONS

Joint forces operate in accordance with applicable rules of engagement (ROE), conduct warfare in compliance with international laws, and fight within restraints and constraints specified by superior commanders. Objectives are justified by military necessity and attained through appropriate and disciplined use of force.

Exercising discipline in operations includes limiting collateral damage — the inadvertent or secondary damage occurring as a result of actions initiated by friendly or enemy forces. Joint force commanders (JFCs) apply the combat power necessary to ensure victory against

combatants, but are careful to limit unnecessary injury and damage. JFC use of forces includes the proper treatment of enemy prisoners of war, noncombatants, and civilians. Laws of war are intended to reduce casualties and enhance fair treatment of combatants and noncombatants alike.

ROE, which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces conduct operations other than war or begin or continue combat, are promulgated by the National Command Authorities. Many factors influence ROE, including national command policy, mission, operational environment, commander's intent, and international agreements regulating conduct. ROE always recognize the inherent right of self-defense. Properly developed ROE are clear and tailored to the situation. ROE will typically vary from operation to operation and may change during an operation.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

DISSEMINATION

Dissemination is conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form. As shown in the figure below, intelligence is disseminated in many forms, using a variety of means. Dissemination means include personal contact, physical transfer or courier of hard copy textual and graphic materials, digital and analog media (magnetic tape and optical disks), video-teleconference, telephones, facsimile transmissions, messages, briefings, remote terminal access to computer data bases, and direct data transfers. In addition, tactical intelligence can be disseminated via intercom, tactical data systems, tactical radio circuits, and tactical radio and satellite broadcasts. Each intelligence dissemination method can be further categorized as secure or nonsecure, over dedicated or common-user communications, and/or raw or finished intelligence. The diversity of forms and dissemination paths reinforces the need for interoperability among command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems.

Joint intelligence dissemination should be consistent with the C4I For The Warrior concept that allows the warfighter to obtain functionally integrated or fused intelligence based on the warrior's requirements for intelligence exchange. This concept allows intelligence organizations external to the joint force to satisfy joint force intelligence needs to the maximum extent possible if they:

- have sufficient knowledge of the joint force requirements through preplanned essential elements of information (which involves tailoring data bases);
- emphasize pushing intelligence to the warfighter (through over-the-air updates);
- accommodate warrior pull on demand (allowing automated access to theater and national data bases through such systems as the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System).

This concept results in timely intelligence, makes maximum use of automation, and minimizes the flow of request for information messages and intelligence reports. Broadcasts such as the tactical information broadcast service and the tactical related applications are examples of over-the-air updates that provide time-sensitive intelligence to tactical commanders.

An important consideration in the dissemination process is management of information transmitted over communications systems. Joint force commanders (JFCs) should ensure for provision of critical, time-sensitive intelligence for force protection and operations, using the



"push-pull" system to receive finished intelligence products from higher or adjacent commanders and intelligence producers. JFCs should manage information dissemination in terms of the product, available communications paths through dynamic bandwidth management, and time sensitivity to ensure the joint force receives what is required to support joint operations. Intelligence dissemination should be continuously reviewed throughout the joint operation.

Related Terms

intelligence cycle

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

DISTRIBUTION

1. The arrangement of troops for any purpose, such as a battle, march, or maneuver. 2. A planned pattern of projectiles about a point. 3. A planned spread of fire to cover a desired frontage or depth. 4. An official delivery of anything, such as orders or supplies. 5. That functional phase of military logistics that embraces the act of dispensing materiel, facilities, and services. 6. The process of assigning military personnel to activities, units, or billets. JP 1-02

Distribution is a function of visibility, management, and transportation. The geographic combatant commander is responsible for maintaining an effective theater distribution network that is consistent with the Services' intertheater policy and procedures and for prescribing unique policies and procedures relating to the theater's distribution network. In general, the commanders of Service component commands will operate their distribution networks in accordance with established Service procedures, using established channels of distribution whenever possible.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

DOCTRINE

Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. JP 1-02

"At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory....It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment."

General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF

"Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort."

General George H. Decker, USA

"Doctrine [is] every action that contributes to unity of purpose... it is what warriors believe in and act on."

Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN Fleet Tactics

"Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting…doctrine provides the basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding."

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting

Military leaders understand the nature and utility of doctrine. Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience with warfare. However, doctrine cannot replace clear thinking or alter a commander's obligation to determine the proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision.

Though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. As such, it represents authoritative guidance for the joint employment of the armed forces.

A large body of joint doctrine (and its supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures) has been and is being developed by the Armed Forces of the United States through the combined effort of the Joint Staff, Services, and combatant commands. Because we operate and fight jointly, we must all learn and practice joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; feed back to the doctrine process the lessons learned in training, exercises, and operations; and ensure Service doctrine and procedures are consistent. This is critical for our present and future effectiveness. Joint doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war.

Related Terms

joint doctrine

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Services of the United States

DOMINANT USER

Dominant User Concept. The geographic combatant commander assigns the Service component which is the principle consumer responsibility for providing or coordinating logistic support to the other Services components in the theater or designated area.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-01.3 JTTP for Movement Control

DROP ZONE

A specific area upon which airborne troops, equipment, or supplies are airdropped. JP 1-02

General. A drop zone (DZ) is a specific area upon which airborne troops, equipment, or supplies are airdropped. Although DZ locations are normally on relatively open, flat terrain, they can in fact be situated on almost any site (including water) suited in size and shape for the intact delivery and recovery of the airdropped personnel and materiel. Key circumstances to consider in evaluating the usefulness of a DZ are as follows:

- Enemy threats in relation to the capabilities of available supporting forces to defend the air and ground phases of the airdrop.
- Its tactical advantages (nearness to the tactical objective or receiving unit, size, defense, and other such advantages) in relation to other available DZs.
- The probable tactical effects (delays, disorganization, injuries, and damage) of any hazardous obstacles (ditches, trees, rocks, and other such obstacles) located on it.
- Accessibility of the drop zone to the supported force or the airdrop force.
- Terrain surrounding the DZ that might limit DZ run-in or DZ escape maneuvers. Selecting a DZ thus involves a judicious exercise of the military art, but historical experience suggests that planners of urgent military operations usually find usable DZs near or even adjacent to tactical objectives and receiving units.

Drop Zone Types.

Tactical. During exercises and operations, tactical DZs (DZs that have not been formally surveyed) are sometimes selected to support highly mobile ground forces. These DZs are evaluated and approved for use using tactical survey procedures. When using a tactical DZ, the airlift unit assumes responsibility for aircraft safety of flight while the receiving unit assumes responsibility for load condition. The DZ size should be determined by method of delivery, load dispersal statistics, discussion with the receiving unit, and professional judgment. Other considerations are recoverability of air drop equipment and survivability or recoverability of the load. For example, small trees covering the entire DZ might limit the recovery of airdrop parachutes, but still allow complete recovery of the loads. Tactical DZs may be created within the boundaries of an existing surveyed DZ if needed to accomplish a particular mission. In this case, the tactical DZ need not use the existing dimensions or axis of approach as long as minimum DZ requirements are still met.

Area. An area DZ, illustrated in the first figure below, consists of a start point (point A), an end point (point B), and a prearranged flight path (line of flight) over a series of acceptable drop sites between these points.

Circular. A circular DZ, shown in the second figure below, has multiple run-in headings. Its size is governed by mission requirements and usable terrain. The entire DZ box fits inside the circle. Water DZs are normally circular in shape. The PI of a circular DZ is normally at the DZ center.

Random Approach. Random approach DZs are circular, square, or rectangular and large enough to permit multiple run-in headings. Any axis of approach may be used as long as the resulting DZ meets minimum criteria for the load being airdropped. The PI is normally placed at the DZ center.

Drop Zone Criteria and Considerations.

Drop Airspeeds. Specific airdrop airspeeds for each type aircraft are published in appropriate Service manuals or technical orders. Except in emergencies, aircraft should not deviate from these established airspeeds. Deceleration to prescribed drop airspeed and attainment of level flight altitude are required to provide a stable platform for the actual airdrop of personnel, supplies, or equipment.

Drop Zone Wind. Drop zone wind information is critical to airdrop accuracy and aircrews must consider wind data from all available sources when determining the computed air release point. In addition to inflight wind data, aircrews are normally provided with drop zone wind information from ground sources (such as combat control teams or drop zone support teams) which includes surface winds and the computed mean effective winds. Additionally, ground sources can relay indications of possible wind shears or local phenomena that could affect wind direction or speed and, ultimately, impact upon airdrop or mission success. Airdrop



operations may not be feasible during conditions of strong or gusty surface winds. The joint force commander (JFC), based on recommendations by the supported commander and the Air Force component commander (AFCC), may accept high risk, cancel, or postpone the operation because of excessive wind velocity on the DZ.

Drop Altitudes. The airborne force commander and airlift mission commander establish minimum altitudes for airdropping personnel and materiel. Minimum altitudes for airdrop operations are based on operational requirements of the personnel and cargo airdrop systems used. In a high-risk, high-threat environment, survivability of airlift aircraft may require dropping parachutists and equipment at the lowest possible altitude. Aircraft performing normal low-altitude, low-velocity airdrop operations should drop above the minimum altitude to increase load survivability.

Drop Zone Size. The JFC determines the general area for the airborne operation. Factors influencing DZ selection are as follows:

- physical characteristics of available DZs and surrounding areas;
- threat assessment;
- method of air delivery;
- number of airdrop loads or personnel;
- length of the desirable dispersion pattern.

Subordinate ground commanders determine specific grid coordinates and grid reference being used and pass these to the AFCC. During exercises and operations, DZ size and selection criteria are the joint responsibility of the AFCC and the supported commander. Following a survey of the DZ, the AFCC determines the probability of success of the airdrop



and provides it to the ground commander. The supported ground commander makes the final decision to accept use of the DZ. For other than Air Force unilateral airdrops, the ground commander may waive normal minimum training DZ sizes on a "by exception" basis. For the most efficient use of the DZ, separate or multiple points of impact should be used for equipment and personnel.

All drop zone criteria and considerations must be within acceptable limits before "green light" on airdrop operations.

If the DZ is too small for the delivery of a full aircraft load of parachutists, the number of parachutists may be reduced, multiple DZs may be used for one aircraft load, or aircraft may employ multiple run-in procedures, commonly referred to as "racetracks." Use of the latter tactic, however, increases risk to enemy action. Normal minimum training DZ sizes are shown in the first figure below.

The second figure below shows normal minimum training DZ sizes for high-altitude airdrop resupply system and high-velocity or delayed opening/high-altitude container delivery system.

Minimum DZ sizes for special operations forces (SOF) are shown in the third figure below and apply unless precluded by mission requirements. The supported SOF unit assumes responsibility for drop accuracy and safety when it establishes and operates the DZ.

Drop Zone Run-In Heading. On circular or random run-in DZs, the ground force commander must evaluate the risk of run-in headings to troops on the ground from load malfunctions. If a run-in heading would place a malfunctioning load in a troop concentration, consideration must be given to changing either the run-in heading or the troop concentration locus.

TACTICAL AIRLIFT DROP ZONE SIZE CRITERIA

CDS (C-130)

ALTITUDE (AGL)*	WIDTH (1)	NO. OF CONTAINERS SINGLE	DOUBLE	LENGTH (2)
To 600 ft	400 yd/365	1	1-2	400 yd/370 m
		2	3-4	450 yd/410 m
		3	5-6	500 yd/460 m
		4	7-8	550 yd/500 m
		5-8	9 or more	700 yd/640 m
Above 600 ft	Add 40 yd/35m to DZ width and length for each 100 ft above 600 ft (20 yd/18m added to each side of the DZ).			

CDS (C-141)

To 600 ft	450 yd/410 m	1	1-2	590 yd/540 m
		2	3-4	615 yd560 m
		3	5-6	665 yd/610 m
		4-8	7-16	765 yd/700 m
		9-14	17-28	915 yd/835 m
		15-20	30-40	1065 yd/975 m
Above 600 ft	Add 40 yd/35m to DZ width and length for each 100 ft above 600 ft (20 yd/18m added to each side of the DZ).			

HEAVY EQUIPMENT

ALTITUDE (AGL)	WIDTH(1)	LENGTH (2) 1 PLATFORM	ADDITIONAL PLATFORMS
To 1000 ft	600 yd/550 m	1000 yd/915 m	Add 400 yd/370 m (C-130) or 500 yd/460 m (C-141 or C-5) to trailing edge for each additional platform.
Above 1000 ft	Add 30 yd/28 m to width and length for each 100 ft above 1100 ft (add 15 yd/14 m to each side of the DZ).		

PERSONNEL

ALTITUDE (AGL)	WIDTH(1)	LENGTH(2) 1 PARACHUTIST	ADDITIONAL PARACHUTISTS
To 1000 ft	600 yd/550 m	600 yd/550 m	Add 75 yd/70 m for each additional parachutist's trailing edge (100 yd/90 m when using CAPES)
Above 1000 ft	Add 30 yd/28 m to width and length for each 100 ft above 1000 ft (add 15 yd/14 m to each side of the DZ).		

1. (a) For day visual formations, increase width by 100 yd/90 m (50 yd/45 m each side).

(b) For station keeping equipment formation, increase width by 400 yd/370 m (200 yd/185 m each side).

(c) Official sunset to sunrise, increase width by 100 yd/90 m for visual drops (50 yd/45 m for each side) or 200 yd/180 m for visual formations (100 yd/90 m each side).

2. Official sunset to sunrise, increase length by 100 yd/90 m for visual drops (50 yd/46 m each end).
*above ground level (AGL)

<table>
<tr><th colspan="4">HIGH-ALTITUDE AIRDROP RESUPPLY SYSTEM (HAARS)
AND HIGH-VELOCITY CONTAINER DELIVERY SYSTEM (CDS)
DROP ZONE SIZE CRITERIA</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">HAARS CDS</td></tr>
<tr><td>Altitude (Feet AGL)</td><td>Width (Yards/Meters)</td><td>Length
(Yards/Meters)</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Up to 3000</td><td rowspan="2">500 yd/460 m</td><td>One to Eight Containers</td><td>Nine or More Containers</td></tr>
<tr><td>1200 yd/1100 m</td><td>1900 yd/1740 m</td></tr>
<tr><td>Above 3000</td><td colspan="3">Add 25 yd/23 m to each side and 50 yd/46 m to each end for every 1000 ft increase in drop altitude</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">HIGH VELOCITY CDS*</td></tr>
<tr><td>Altitude (Feet AGL)</td><td>Width (Yards/Meters)</td><td>Length
(Yards/Meters)</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Up to 3000</td><td rowspan="2">580 yd/530 m</td><td>One to Eight Containers</td><td>Nine or More Containers</td></tr>
<tr><td>660 yd/600 m</td><td>Add 50 yd/45 m to trailing edge for each additional container</td></tr>
<tr><td>Above 3000</td><td colspan="3">Add 25 yd/23 m to each side and 100 yd/90 m to each end for every 1000 ft increase in drop altitude</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">*Using 12-foot, 22-foot, or 26-foot ring slot parachutes
AGL - above ground level</td></tr>
</table>

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DROP ZONE SIZE CRITERIA

MARKED DROP ZONES

Type Drop	MC-130 (W x L)	AWADS (W x L)	C-130 (W x L)	C-141 (W x L)
Personnel (computer air release point (CARP))	300 x 300 yd 275 x 275 m	600 x 600 yd 550 x 550 m	600 x 600 yd 550 x 550 m	600 x 600 yd 550 x 550 m
Ground marked release system (GMRS)	300 x 300 yd 275 x 275 m	300 x 300 yd 275 x 275 m	300 x 300 yd 275 x 275 m	300 x 300 yd 275 x 275 m
Add 75 yd (69 m) to the length for each additional parachutist.				
CDS/CRS (CARP & GMRS)	400 x 400 yd 365 x 365 m	400 x 400 yd 365 x 365 m	400 x 400 yd 365 x 365 m	450 x 590 yd 410 x 540 m
Add 50 yd (45 m) to the DZ length for each additional container.				
HSLLADS/HSK (CARP & GMRS)	300 x 600 yd 275 x 550 m	N/A	N/A	N/A
Recovery Kit (CARP & GMRS)	200 x 200 yd 180 x 180 m	400 x 400 yd 365 x 365 m	400 x 400 yd 365 x 365 m	N/A
Heavy Equipment (CARP & GMRS)	600 x 1000 yd 550 x 915 m	600 x 1000 yd 550 x 915 m	600 x 1000 yd 550 x 915 m	600 x 1000 yd 550 x 915 m
For all except C-141, add 400 yd (366 m) to DZ length for each additional platform. For C-141, add 500 yd (457 m) to DZ length for each additional platform.				

BLIND DROP ZONES (1)

(Natural Radar Targets Only or Radar Beacon/Zone Marker on the DZ)

Type Drop	MC-130 (W x L)	AWADS (W x L)	C-130 (W x L)	C-141 (W x L)2
Personnel	600 x 600 yd 550 x 550 m	600 x 600 yd 550 x 550 m	600 x 600 yd 550 x 550 m	600 x 600 yd 550 x 550 m
Add 75 yd (69 m) to the length for each additional parachutist.				
CDS/container recovery system (CRS)	400 x 400 yd 365 x 365 m	400 x 400 yd 365 x 365 m	400 x 400 yd 365 x 365 m	450 x 590 yd 410 x 540 m
Add 50 yd (45 m) to the DZ length for each additional container.				
HSLLADS/HSK*	400 x 600 yd	N/A	N/A	N/A
Recovery Kit	400 x 400 yd 365 x 365 m	400 x 400 yd 365 x 365 m	400 x 400 yd 365 x 365 m	N/A
Heavy Equipment	600 x 1000 yd 550 x 915 m	600 x 1000 yd 550 x 915 m	600 x 1000 yd 550 x 915 m	600 x 1000 yd 550 x 915 m
For all except C-141, add 400 yd (366 m) to DZ length for each additional platform. For C-141, add 500 yd (457 m) to DZ length for each additional platform.				

1. For all blind drops, add 30 yd (27 m) to each side and 30 yd (27 m) to each end of the DZ for each 100 ft increase in altitude above the minimum drop altitude for the load being dropped.
2. C-141 aircraft require a SKE zone marker for blind drops.
3. When supporting SOF, specially trained theater and intertheater airlift crews may be called upon to conduct airdroip operations on a blind drop zone. A blind DZ is one that is unmarked.

*High-speed, Low-Level air drop system/high-speed air drop

Related Terms

airlift operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

ECHELONS OF CARE

Five echelons of care make up the health service support (HSS) system, extending from the point of wounding, injury, or illness. (See figure below.) Each succeeding echelon possesses the same treatment capabilities as those echelons forward and adds a new treatment capability.

Echelon I. Care is rendered at the unit level and includes self aid and buddy aid, examination, and emergency lifesaving measures. These elements of medical management prepare patients for return to duty (RTD) or for transportation to a higher echelon of care. Supporting medical units are responsible for evacuation of patients from medical treatment facilities (MTFs) forward of the supporting medical unit's position.

Echelon II. Care is administered at an HSS organization by a team of physicians or physician assistants, supported by appropriate medical, technical, or nursing staff. As a minimum, this echelon of care includes basic resuscitation and stabilization and may include surgical capability, basic laboratory, limited x-ray, pharmacy, and temporary holding ward facilities. At this echelon, examinations and observations are accomplished more deliberately than at Echelon I.

Echelon III. Care administered requires clinical capabilities normally found in a MTF that is typically located in a lower-level enemy threat environment. The MTF is staffed and equipped to provide resuscitation, initial wound surgery, and post operative treatment. This echelon's care may be the first step toward restoration of functional health, as compared to procedures that stabilize a condition or prolong life. It does not have the crises aspects of initial resuscitative care and can proceed with greater preparation and deliberation.

Echelon IV. This echelon of care will provide not only a surgical capability as provided in Echelon III, but also further definitive therapy for patients in the recovery phase who can return to duty within the theater evacuation policy. Definitive care is normally provided by a communications zone Fleet Hospital, General Hospital, or overseas MTF. If rehabilitation

Hospital Ships, a mobile element of the Theater Combat Medical System, provide Echelon III medical care, a capability designed to restore functional health and return the wounded, injured, or ill to their units as soon as possible.

cannot be accomplished within a predetermined holding period, the casualties/patients are evacuated to the zone of Interior, Echelon V.

Echelon V. Care is convalescent, restorative, and rehabilitative and is normally provided by military, Department of Veterans Affairs, or civilian hospitals in the continental US. This phase may include a period of minimal care and increasing physical activity necessary to restore patients to functional health and allow their RTD or useful life.



Related Terms

health service support

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

ECONOMY OF FORCE

The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

Related Terms

principles of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. a. electronic attack — That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). b. electronic protection — That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP. c. electronic warfare support — That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), both communications intelligence (COMINT), and electronics intelligence (ELINT). JP 1-02

General. Electronic warfare (EW) is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Control of the electromagnetic spectrum ranges from protecting friendly systems to countering enemy

systems. This control is not limited to radio or radar frequencies, but includes optical and infrared regions as well as those regions in which directed-energy weapons might function.

The three major subdivisions of EW are electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support, which may overlap. Some EW actions may be both offensive and protective in nature and may inherently use electronic surveillance in their execution. EW should be employed to attack the enemy according to established principles of warfare. The decision to employ EW should be based not only on overall joint campaign objectives but also the risks of possible enemy responses and other effects on the campaign effort.

The joint force commander (JFC) should ensure maximum coordination among EW and other operations activities, and intelligence and communications (including frequency management) support activities for maximum effect. This coordination is necessary to ensure effective exchange of information, eliminate undesirable duplication of effort, and provide for mutual support.

The EA-6B provides the JFC with active suppression measures using both destructive and disruptive means.

All three aspects of EW, electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES), contribute to the command and control warfare (C2W) effort. EA is concerned with denying an adversary commander use of the electronic spectrum to effectively command and control operating forces. EP is involved with guaranteeing use of the electronic spectrum for the JFC to command and control friendly forces. ES contributes to the JFC's accurate estimate of the situation in the operational area.

EW in command and control (C2)-attack. Each of the three divisions of EW — ES, EA, and EP — can contribute to C2-attack operations. ES, in the form of combat information, can provide the real time information required to locate and identify C2 nodes and supporting/supported early warning and offensive systems during C2-attack missions. ES, used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), can provide timely intelligence about an adversary's C2 capabilities and limitations that can be used to update previously known information about the adversary's C2 systems. This updated information can be used to plan C2-attack operations and provide battle damage assessment and feedback on the effectiveness of the overall C2W plan.

EA — whether jamming, electromagnetic deception, or destruction of C2 nodes with directed-energy (DE) weapons or antiradiation missiles (ARMs) — has a major role to play

in almost all C2-attack operations in a combat environment.

EP's role in C2-attack and other operations is to protect the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum for use by friendly forces. Coordination of the use of the EM spectrum by friendly forces through the Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) is a means of preventing fratricide among friendly electronic emissions. Equipment and procedures designed to prevent adversary disruption or exploitation of the EM spectrum are the best means friendly forces have to ensure their own uninterrupted use of the EM spectrum during C2-attack operations.

EW in C2-protect. Each of the three divisions of EW can also make a contribution to friendly C2-protect efforts. ES, supported by SIGINT data, can be used to monitor for impending adversary attack on friendly C2 nodes. ES, in the form of Signal Security monitoring, can be used to identify potential sources of information for an adversary to obtain knowledge about friendly C2 systems.

EA, whether jamming, electromagnetic deception, or DE weapons/ARMs can be used to defend a friendly force from adversary C2-attack. EP should be used in C2-protect to safeguard friendly forces from exploitation by adversary ES/SIGINT operations. Frequency deconfliction through the use of the JRFL is also a key to a successful coordinated defense against adversary C2-attack operations.

Related Terms

command and control warfare; communications intelligence; electronics intelligence; information warfare; signals intelligence; spectrum management

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 3-13.1	Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

Electronic attack, whether in the form of jamming, electromagnetic deception, or destruction of C2 nodes, has a major role to play in almost all C2-attack operations.

ELEMENTS OF THE LOGISTIC PROCESS

For each of the functional areas of supply systems, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and miscellaneous services, the geographic combatant commander should consider the four elements of the logistic process: acquisition, distribution, sustainment,

and disposition. At the theater strategic level, specific considerations include: logistic resources necessary to generate combat forces and sustain their operations; the procurement process to ensure the availability of logistic resources in a timely manner; the process of allocating available logistic resources among subordinate commands; and the distribution system necessary to achieve the maximum combat effectiveness. Theater strategic considerations are shown in the figure below.



At the theater operational level, specific considerations include identification of operational requirements and establishment of priorities for the employment of the resources provided. Geographic combatant commanders should understand that these functions will vary in definition and application, and plan accordingly. Efforts should be made to standardize these functions without inhibiting operations. Logistic functions should use existing policies and procedures of the Service components whenever possible. If it is not possible to use existing policies and procedures of the Service components, the geographic combatant commanders must identify and resolve differences with Service commanders early in the planning process to ascertain the degree of uninterrupted logistic support in the theater. These procedures apply across the range of military operations. Ideally, prior deliberate planning and testing of these modifications in joint exercises should be conducted to ensure adequate logistic support for the expected joint operations.

Related Terms

levels of logistic support

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

EMBARKATION

The process of putting personnel and/or vehicles and their associated stores and equipment into ships and/or aircraft. JP 1-02

Embarkation Phase. The embarkation phase of a amphibious operation (PHIBOP) encompasses the orderly assembly of personnel and material and their subsequent loading aboard ships and/or aircraft in a sequence designed to meet the requirements of the landing force (LF) concept of operations ashore.

Developments Affecting Embarkation Planning. Ongoing development and improvement techniques for projection of combat power ashore and the subsequent support of the LF through enhanced mobility systems require continued emphasis on flexible and responsive embarkation planning.

Effects of Improvements in Mobility. New developments, such as vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, over-the-horizon craft, and improved amphibious shipping have, and will continue to have, a pronounced effect on PHIBOPs. (See figure below.) These new developments do not change fundamental embarkation doctrine, but in some instances, new techniques and procedures in planning, organizing, and executing embarkation must be employed.

Greater Dispersion of Shipping. The vulnerability of the amphibious task force (ATF) to attack is decreased by emphasizing speed, surprise, mobility, and dispersion. LF units must be embarked so as to best accomplish the assault while minimizing the effects of possible loss of ships and their embarked units. The concentration of ships in major port areas is reduced by using several separated ports and open beaches for embarkation. Ships, personnel, supplies, and equipment are echeloned into embarkation areas to reduce congestion.

In the objective area, the sea echelon may be employed, which requires ships to disperse and phase into the unloading areas according to prearranged plans or as needed.

Embarkation Execution. Embarkation of the assault echelons (assault echelon and assault follow-on echelon) will be in accordance with the approved operation and embarkation plan and is a mutual responsibility of the commander, amphibious task force, commander, landing force, and external supporting agencies.

Mutual Effort. Embarkation is a joint undertaking by both LF and naval forces. Proper embarkation depends to a large extent on both mutual understanding of objectives and capabilities and full cooperation in planning and execution. Throughout the planning and execution of the PHIBOP, LF officers will be working with their Navy counterparts.

Degree of Flexibility. Ideally, units embarked for combat should be loaded to allow almost unlimited flexibility in landing at the objective area. This desired degree of flexibility can seldom be attained, however. The organization for embarkation of the landing force must be compatible with the plan for the ship-to-shore movement which, in turn, must support the scheme of maneuver ashore. Insofar as possible, each ship of the amphibious task force must be loaded to provide maximum flexibility to meet possible changes in the tactical plan and to facilitate discharge of cargo to meet emergency calls for personnel, equipment, and supplies.



Importance of Proper Embarkation. A characteristic of successful PHIBOPs is the rapid and effective manner in which assault troops establish themselves ashore. The power and size of the LF must be expanded to the maximum extent necessary to carry out its mission in the shortest possible time. This expansion requires a rapid, yet orderly buildup of men and material, which depends in large measure on the manner in which the ships have been loaded. Proper loading increases the inherent flexibility of the ATF and is a key factor in ensuring success. Conversely, improper loading can seriously jeopardize an operation.

Use of Military Sealift Command (MSC) Ships. MSC ships have been and will continue to be used to augment the ATF's shipping requirements.

Use of Combatant Ships. Throughout US Naval history, troops have been required to embark aboard combatant ships such as destroyers, cruisers, and carriers for rapid movement to an objective area. These situations developed under circumstances of great importance and urgency when time was a cardinal consideration. Accordingly, direct liaison between the embarking unit and the combatant ship should be authorized to ensure mutual understanding and expeditious embarkation.

Embarkation Security. In developing amphibious embarkation and deployment planning, significant consideration must be given to detailed security and counterintelligence (CI) support requirements. CI as a separate and distinct discipline from intelligence can provide in depth information on the enemy's intelligence collection effort and capability. CI, specifically the Counterintelligence Support Officers (CISOs) of the unified commands and the component CI elements, affords commanders the ability to enhance their force protection efforts from inception of planning to execution of any operation plan. The CISO, guided by command directives in consonance with the joint publication on CI, can provide commanders the advice and assistance necessary to develop detailed and coordinated CI actions in support of security, operations security, force protection, and operational planning.

Related Terms

amphibious operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-02.2 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation

EMPLOYMENT PLANNING

Planning that prescribes how to apply force/forces to attain specified military objectives. Employment planning concepts are developed by combatant commanders through their component commanders. JP 1-02

General. Employment is the strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces within an operational area. Employment planning defines how existing and projected capabilities will be used to attain objectives. It involves military actions required to pursue warfare successfully: evaluating enemy actions and capabilities, devising and selecting courses of action, and positioning forces and resources to create advantages in combat and exploit resulting opportunities to attain objectives despite enemy resistance. Employment planning influences and drives planning in the other mission areas of joint operation planning.

Mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning support the concepts and requirements developed through employment planning. Detailed planning for the actual use of forces and materiel within the operational area is normally accomplished as part of joint operation planning by subordinate commanders, such as component and subordinate joint force commanders. However, in the broader context of joint operation planning, each

level of command plans for the employment of its available forces and resources to achieve specified objectives.

National Level. At the national level, strategic plans provide for the global and theater employment of national capabilities to achieve national security and military objectives. This planning considers global requirements, national capabilities, and the theater strategies and campaigns of the combatant commanders. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan describes strategic concepts, defines supporting regional objectives, and apportions forces and resources among the combatant commanders to attain prioritized national objectives. National strategic planning for mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment is based on the planned employment of forces in the individual theaters.

Theater Level. Employment planning at the theater level focuses on organizing and positioning assigned and augmenting forces for the conduct of theater campaigns or major operations to attain strategic and/or theater objectives. The combatant commander's strategic employment concept defines objectives, organizes forces, arranges and prioritizes operations, assigns tasks, and prioritizes the movement of forces and support to and within the theater. It provides strategic direction to the employment planning of subordinate commands and, when appropriate, supports alliance, coalition or treaty plans for the employment of multinational forces. Theater strategic employment planning provides the foundation for the concept of operations for joint operation plans (OPLANs) prepared by the combatant commander and the framework for mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning.

Subordinate Level. Subordinate commands, such as component commands and subordinate joint force commands, normally accomplish the detailed employment planning for the conduct of joint operations to perform missions tasked by the combatant commanders. When part of an alliance or a coalition organization, detailed employment planning is performed within the multinational or bilateral chain of command in support of multinational strategies, campaigns, and missions. Under these circumstances, multinational employment plans become the basis for joint OPLANs prepared within the US chain of command that plan for moving, preparing, and sustaining US forces dedicated to multinational operations.

Key Planning Concepts. To facilitate coordination of strategic priorities, deliberate and crisis action plans should contain key planning concepts that enhance understanding of the combatant commander's strategic vision and the sequence of operations needed to attain the commander's theater objectives. These concepts are shown in the figure below. Because of

KEY PLANNING CONCEPTS

To the extent possible, plans should incorporate the following concepts of joint operation planning doctrine:

- **Combatant commander's strategic intent and operational focus.**
- **Orientation on the strategic and operational centers of gravity of the threat.**
- **Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity.**
- **Phasing of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow through, and post hostilities), to include the commander's intent for each phase.**

the ambiguous nature of the threat in some plans, all of these concepts may not be applicable. Where possible, they should at least be considered and identified in the plan.

DESERT STORM Campaign Plan

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, in his autobiography, "It Doesn't Take a Hero," recounts the events of November 14, 1990, the day he briefed his senior commanders on his campaign plan to drive the Iraqi forces from Kuwait during Desert Storm. After asserting that this would be the most important meeting of the war, General Schwarzkopf acknowledges the twenty-two generals who were in attendance, commenting "that no other theater commander in history had ever been blessed with such an array of talent," and describes his battle plan...

"The first thing that we're going to have to do is, I don't like to use the word 'decapitate,' so I think I'll use the word 'attack,' leadership, and go after his command and control. Number two, we've got to gain and maintain air superiority. Number three, we need to cut totally his supply lines. We also need to destroy his chemical, biological, and nuclear capability. And finally, all you tankers, listen to this. We need to destroy — not attack, not damage, not surround — I want you to destroy the Republican Guard. When you're done with them, I don't want them to be an effective fighting force anymore. I don't want them to exist as a military organization.' For the benefit of the Vietnam vets — practically the whole room — I emphasized that 'we're not going into this with one arm tied behind our backs. We're not gonna say we want to be as nice as we possibly can, and if they draw back across the border that's fine with us. That's bullshit! We are going to destroy the Republican Guard.' If we were ordered to go on the offensive, we would be free to use our full military strength and attack across the border into Iraq.

'I'm now going to tell you all some stuff that not very many people know about, in Washington particularly,' I said, and described the four phases of attack we'd mapped out for Desert Storm: strategic bombing first; then gaining control of the Kuwaiti skies; then bombing Iraqi artillery positions, trench lines, and troops. At last I turned to the plan for the ground offensive — a fully realized version of the envelopment I'd proposed to (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General) Powell three weeks before. Using the map, I showed the commanders where I wanted them to maneuver their units. The plan covered a huge area: in order to make sure we fought the campaign on our own terms, we had extended the boundary of the battlefield westward so that it encompassed a rectangle roughly the size of Pennsylvania. Saddam's forces were concentrated at the eastern end, in and around Kuwait. Desert Shield forces would keep them from moving south; to their east was the natural barrier of the gulf; to their north was the Euphrates, which would become a natural barrier once (Joint Force Air Component Commander, Lieutenant General) Chuck Horner's air force dropped the bridges that crossed it; and to the west were hundreds of miles of desert that would become our main avenue of attack.

'I anticipated,' I said, 'a four-pronged ground assault.' Along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border near the gulf, I wanted two divisions of US Marines and a Saudi task force to thrust straight into Kuwait, with the objective of tying up Saddam's forces and eventually encircling Kuwait City. Nodding in (US Marine Commander in DESERT STORM, Lieutenant General, Walter E.) Boomer's

direction, I said, 'I'll leave it to Walt Boomer to figure out how he wants to do that, but it also gives him the capability to come in from the sea with his amphibious forces.' I'd reserved a second corridor, in the western part of Kuwait, for a parallel attack by the pan-Arab forces led by two armored divisions from Egypt and another Saudi task force. Their objective would be the road junction northwest of Kuwait City that controlled Iraqi supply lines. Eventually they would enter Kuwait City and have the dirty job of fighting the Iraqis house to house if necessary.

Meanwhile from the west would come the US Army's power punch. Looking at (Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps, Lieutenant General) Gary Luck, I indicated a section of Saudi-Iraqi border more than three hundred and fifty miles inland. 'I am probably going to send the XVIII Airborne Corps very deep,' I said, showing how I wanted Luck's divisions to race north from that area to the Euphrates, blocking the Republican Guard's last route of retreat. Once that sector was secured I told him, he would hook his forces east, ready to join the attack on the main body of the Iraqi army. Finally I turned to (Commander, VII Corps, Lieutenant General) Fred Franks. 'I think it's pretty obvious what your mission is going to be', I said, moving my hand along the desert corridor just to the west of Kuwait, 'attack through here and destroy the Republican Guard.' I wanted to pin them with their backs against the sea, and then go in and wipe them out. I couldn't resist adding, 'Once they're gone, be prepared to continue the attack to Baghdad. Because there isn't going to be anything else out there.' I allowed that taking Baghdad would probably be unnecessary, because by then the war would have ended.

After a question-and-answer session I tried to set a tone for the coming months. 'Let me leave you with one thought, guys. In order for this to succeed — because the enemy is still going to outnumber us — it is going to take, for lack of a better word, killer instinct on the part of all of our leaders out there.' I pointed again at the map. 'What I'm saying is when the Marines hit the wire right here and when the Army forces hit the wire over here...we need commanders in the lead who absolutely, dearly understand that they will get through. And that once they're through they're not going to stop and discuss it. They are going to go up there and destroy the Republican Guard. I cannot afford to have commanders who do not understand that it is attack, attack, attack, attack, and destroy every step of the way. If you have somebody who doesn't understand it, I would strongly recommend that you consider removing him from command and putting in somebody that can do the job.

'Because, let's face it, the prestige of the United States military is on our shoulders. But more importantly, the prestige of the entire United States of America rests on our shoulders. There isn't going to be anybody else in this thing except us. There are no more forces coming. What we got is what's going to do the job. And for our country we dare not fail. We cannot fail, and we will not fail. Anybody in here who doesn't understand that, get out of the way. Any questions? Okay, good luck to you. You know what needs to be done."

Source: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre: It Doesn't Take a Hero, Bantam Books, 1992

Related Terms

deployment planning; redeployment planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

END STATE

What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude — both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power. JP 1-02

The desired end state should be clearly described by the National Command Authorities before Armed Forces of the United States are committed to an action. An end state is the set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives. There may be a preliminary end state — described by a set of military conditions — when military force is no longer the principal means to the strategic aim. There may also be a broader end state that typically involves returning to a state of peace and stability and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military conditions. The relative emphasis among these instruments of national power will vary according to the nature of the crisis.

Although military end state conditions normally will represent what combatant commanders want their campaigns to achieve, commanders are rarely concerned with only those conditions. Often, combatant commanders may be required to support the other instruments of national power as directed by national and multinational leadership.

Defining the end state, which may change as the operation progresses, and ensuring it supports achieving national objectives are the critical first steps in the estimate and planning process. Additionally, clearly defining the desired end state reduces the wasting of scarce resources and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the operation. In order to clearly describe the desired end state, planners should consider what may be necessary to end the armed conflict and the period of postconflict activities likely to follow. Commanders at all levels should have a common understanding of the conditions that define success before initiation of the operation.

Achieving the desired end state seldom, if ever, ends US national efforts to protect interests in a situation. The term “end state” simply represents the set of conditions necessary to resolve a crisis and transition from predominant use of the military instrument of national power to other instruments.

Related Terms

termination

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES PROGRAMS

prisoner of war
A detained person as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. In particular, one who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. As such, he or she is entitled to the combatant's privilege of immunity from the municipal law of the capturing state for warlike acts which do not amount to breaches of the law of armed conflict. For example, a prisoner of war may be, but is not limited to, any person belonging to one of the following categories who has fallen into the power of the enemy: a member of the armed forces, organized militia or volunteer corps; a person who accompanies the armed forces without actually being a member thereof; a member of a merchant marine or civilian aircraft crew not qualifying for more favorable treatment; or individuals who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces. JP 1-02

civilian internee
1. A civilian who is interned during armed conflict or occupation for security reasons or for protection or because he has committed an offense against the detaining power. 2. A term used to refer to persons interned and protected in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 (Geneva Convention). JP 1-02

Support to Department of Defense Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) and Civilian Internees (CI) Programs. Civil affairs assets may be tasked by commanders to provide technical advice and assistance to security and law enforcement personnel in implementing EPW/CI operations. Such coordination may include, but is not limited to:

- Identification of individuals who are EPW, CI, or otherwise detained by the Armed Forces of the United States.
- Review of EPW/CI plans and operations to ensure detainee understanding of written procedures, rules, and regulations; administrative and security requirements; food services, hygiene, medical, and other provisions; and labor and other program arrangements.
- Assistance in liaison with civil-military authorities of a detaining power with regard to US captured or detained EPW/CI.

Enemy Prisoner of War Operations

The success of the enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM can be attributed, in part, to the lessons learned in the war in Vietnam. During that conflict, Armed Forces of the United States dealt with the international transfer of US and Allied EPWs to an ally; conducted military liaison with the EPW camp authorities of that ally; coordinated with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); determined training requirements for EPW units; and established the need for an enemy prisoner of war information system, centralized management, and accurate accountability. It is also due in great measure to adherence to the

various agreements and conventions dealing with enemy prisoners of war, displaced persons and refugees.

The most important requirements of international law pertaining to persons captured or detained during an armed conflict are detailed in the four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims. Specific requirements for the humane treatment and full accountability of prisoners of war are found in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), governs similar treatment and accountability of civilians.

Treatment and accountability of EPWs generated international interest and concern. In addition to other concerns, religious and cultural sensitivities were a factor. All EPWs and displaced civilians captured by Coalition forces during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM were eventually turned over to Saudi control to insure that Arab prisoners were treated in accordance with Arab culture and Islamic religious practice.

During Operation DESERT STORM, Coalition forces captured 86,743 EPWs. Approximately 69,822 EPWs and displaced civilians were processed through US operated facilities between January, when the first EPW was captured, and May 1991. (By agreement, the United States also accepted EPWs and displaced civilians from UK and France and transferred them to Saudi Arabian installations.) US forces provided food, shelter, and medical care to both EPWs and more than 1,400 civilian displaced persons or refugees during this period. Eight EPWs died in US custody; all as a result of injuries or sickness contracted prior to capture. Five died from combat injuries, one from malnutrition/ dehydration, and two from unknown causes. Three US transferred prisoners died in Saudi camps due to wounds received while interned in the Saudi controlled camps. These deaths were investigated and reported through command channels to the ICRC, as required by GPW.

CUMULATIVE EPW AND DISPLACED CIVILIANS CAPTURED/SURRENDERED

United States Forces	63,948*
Arab Forces	16,921
British Forces	5,005
French Forces	869
Total All Forces:	86,743

* Displaced Civilians (1,492) are included in the US Forces numbers.

Interrogations of some detainees initially identified as EPWs determined that several were civilians who had not taken part in hostile actions against the Coalition forces. In some cases, they had surrendered to the Coalition to receive food and lodging. Under Article 5 of the GPW, tribunals were conducted to determine whether civilians were entitled to be granted EPW status. For those detainees whose status was questionable, tribunals were conducted to

verify status, based upon the individual's relationship to the military and participation in the war. A total of 1,196 tribunal hearings were conducted. As a result, 310 persons were granted EPW status; the others were determined to be displaced civilians and were treated as refugees. No civilian was found to have acted as an unlawful combatant.

Centralized EPW management began during Operation DESERT SHIELD and continued throughout Operation DESERT STORM. The US National Prisoner of War Information Center (NPWIC) was fully operational before the ground offensive began, and a new automated program for compiling information on and accounting for captured personnel (as required by the GPW) was fielded in Operation DESERT SHIELD. Trained Reserve Component (RC) EPW units were activated, and camp advisory teams were sent to Saudi Arabia to establish liaison with Saudi units to provide technical assistance, and to maintain accountability for EPWs and displaced civilians transferred to the Saudis.

Source: DOD Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992

Related Terms

civil affairs

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS

These are operations which employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. These operations are military in nature and serve both political and military purposes. The political objective is to compel a country or group to conform to the objectives of the initiating body. The military objective is to establish a barrier which is selective, allowing only those goods authorized to enter or exit. Depending on geography, sanction enforcement normally involves some combination of air and surface forces. Assigned forces should be capable of complementary mutual support and full communications compatibility. An example of sanctions enforcement is Operation SUPPORT DEMOCRACY conducted off the coast of Haiti beginning in 1993.

Related Terms

maritime intercept operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

ENFORCING EXCLUSION ZONES

An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area. Exclusion zones can be established in the air (no-fly zones), sea (maritime), or on land. The purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of force. The measures are usually imposed by the United Nations, or other international bodies of which the US is a member. However, they may also be imposed

unilaterally by the US. Exclusion zones are usually imposed due to breaches of international standards of human rights or flagrant abuse of international law regarding the conduct of states. Situations which may warrant such action include the persecution of the civil population by a government; or to deter an attempt by a hostile nation to acquire territory by force. The sanctions may create economic, political, military, or other conditions where the intent is to change the behavior of the offending nation. Examples of enforcement of exclusion zones are Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq, initiated in 1992, and Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, initiated in 1993.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

ENSURING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT

Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight operations are conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate sea or air routes. Freedom of navigation is a sovereign right according to international law.

International law has long recognized that a coastal state may exercise jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea in the same manner that it can exercise sovereignty over its own land territory. International law accords the right of "innocent" passage to ships of other nations through a state's territorial waters. Passage is "innocent" as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. The high seas are free for reasonable use of all states.

Freedom of navigation by aircraft through international airspace is a well-established principle of international law. Aircraft threatened by nations or groups through the extension of airspace control zones outside the established international norms will result in legal measures to rectify the situation. These norms are developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization. An example is the Berlin air corridors that existed from 1948 until 1990, allowing air access to West Berlin. The ATTAIN DOCUMENT series of operations against Libya in 1986 are examples of freedom of navigation operations, both air and sea, in the Gulf of Sidra.

Related Terms

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

ESTIMATE OF LOGISTIC FEASIBILITY

A logistic sustainability assessment of each operation plan (OPLAN) will be accomplished after completion of all concurrent logistic planning by supporting unified and Service component commanders. Initially, an estimate of logistic feasibility will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the commanders of combatant commands (CINCs) as part of the OPLAN summary. The estimate may encompass any appropriate remarks affecting logistic tasks. As a minimum, the estimate will address the pillars of logistic support, that is materiel resources, combat support, combat service support, infrastructure including facilities, and lift. In addition, a statement will be provided to see whether the plan is considered supportable.

Upon completion of all logistic planning a definitive analysis will be made of the OPLAN. A comprehensive analysis of the four pillars of logistic support and their subelements for the duration of the OPLAN will be accomplished. Services will provide critical item sustainability data as requested by the CINCs and outlined in this volume. Reasonably assured wartime host-nation support must be considered in all assessments and documented. Logistic limitations and shortfalls will be documented with accompanying narrative in Appendix 6 to Annex D of the OPLAN. The analysis will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not later than 45 days after unified or specified command review of their component command supporting plans. Thereafter, the update analysis will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the annual plan review or when significant changes occur that influence mission accomplishment.

Related Terms

deliberate planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System; operation plan

Source Joint Publications

CJCSM 3122.03 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

The Estimate Process and Strategy. The term "estimate" implies a one-sided evaluation of a two or more sided issue where many of the pertinent facts are unknown or distorted. The estimate assists in clarifying problems and devising integrated solutions to complex problems, thus reducing surprise and shock. A continuous estimate process provides a framework for disciplined reason even under the most trying circumstances. The estimate is the central focus for strategic, operational, and tactical analysis that needs to be maintained over time and in the face of continuing change. The first questions in any estimate are the following: What is the mission? What is the desired end state? What has changed? What are the resulting possibilities and consequences?

Combatant commanders develop and modify strategic estimates based on their assigned tasks after reviewing the strategic environment, the various threats, the nature of anticipated operations, national and alliance strategic direction, and forces available. Functionally oriented combatant commanders develop estimates for each theater they support. Operations in one theater often affect other theaters. The interrelationships among theaters, therefore, are important in the assessment of a theater's strategic environment and development of the strategic estimate.

The estimate process is continuous, with the combatant commander's staff contributing to the product. The strategic estimate itself acts as the basis for strategy, plans, and actions that occur in response to deliberate taskings or crises. Where a subordinate commander's estimate of the situation is typically used for near term decisions and may lead to an operation plan, the combatant commander's strategic estimate results in operational concepts and courses of action — broad statements of what is to be accomplished. One of the critical parts of the estimate process is defining the strategic end state to be achieved.

Supported by the strategic estimate(s), combatant commanders develop strategies consistent with national policy and plans. These strategies translate national and multinational direction into concepts to meet strategic and joint operation planning requirements. Combatant commanders' plans provide strategic direction; assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate rules of engagement (approved by the National Command Authorities); establish constraints and restraints; and

define policies and concepts to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans. (See figure below.)

The estimate process is central to formulating and updating military action to meet the requirements of any situation. The estimate process should be used by commanders and staffs at all levels. Though its central framework for organizing inquiry and decision is essentially the same for any level of command, specific detailed questions within each part of this framework will vary depending on the level and type of operation. This framework is presented below. Specific material appropriate to joint force operations, especially for theaters of war and theaters of operations, has been added to flesh out the basic framework for readers of this term.

Mission.

Mission Analysis

- Determine the higher command's purpose. Analyze national security and national military strategic direction as well as appropriate guidance in alliance and coalition directions, including long- and short-term objectives for conflict termination. Conflict termination objectives should include the military objectives that will provide the basis for realizing the political aim regardless of whether an imposed or negotiated termination is sought.
- Determine specified and implied tasks. If multiple, determine priorities.

Mission Statement

- Express in terms of who, what, when, where (task parameters), and why (purpose).
- Frame as a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished and the purpose to be achieved.



Situation Analysis.

Geostrategic Context. Domestic and international context: political and/or diplomatic long- and short-term causes of conflict; domestic influences, including public will, competing demands for resources, and political, economic, legal, and moral constraints; international interests (reinforcing or conflicting with US interests, including positions of parties neutral to the conflict), international law, positions of international organizations, and other competing or distracting international situations.

Characteristics of the operational area, including: military geography (topography, hydrography, climate, and weather); transportation; telecommunications; economics (organization, industrial base, mobilization capacity); social conditions; science and technology factors affecting the operational area.

Analysis of the Enemy. Enemy situation, including capabilities and vulnerabilities (at the theater level, commanders will normally have available a formal intelligence estimate).

- Broad military courses of action (COAs) being taken and available in the future.
- Political and military intentions and objectives (to extent known).
- Military strategic and operational advantages and limitations.
- Possible external military support.
- Center(s) of gravity (strategic and operational).
- Specific operational characteristics: strength, composition, location and disposition, reinforcements, logistics, time and space factors (including basing utilized and available), and combat efficiency (including proficiency in joint operations).

Friendly Situation. Should follow the same pattern used for the analysis of the enemy. At the theater level, commanders will normally have available specific supporting estimates, including personnel, logistics, and command, control, communications, and computers estimates; multinational operations require specific analysis of alliance or coalition partner objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

Restrictions. Those limitations to the use or threat of use of force that are imposed or necessary to support other worldwide strategic requirements and associated diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts.

Assumptions. Assumptions are intrinsically important factors on which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such.

Deductions. Deductions from above analysis should yield estimates of relative combat power, including enemy capabilities that can affect mission accomplishment.

Courses of Action Analysis. COAs development (based on the above analysis and a creative determination of how the mission will be accomplished). Each COA must be adequate, feasible, and acceptable. State all practical COAs open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission. Generally, at the theater level, each COA will constitute a theater strategic or operational concept and should outline the following:

- Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished in the order in which they are to be accomplished.
- Forces required.
- Logistic concept.
- Deployment concept.
- Estimate of time required to reach termination objectives.
- Concept for maintaining a theater reserve.

Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action

- Determine the probable effect of possible enemy COAs on the success of each friendly COA.

- Conduct this analysis in an orderly manner: by time phasing, geographic location, and functional event. Consider the potential actions of subordinates two echelons down.
- Consider conflict termination issues; think through own action, enemy reaction, counterreaction.
- Conclude with revalidation of suitability, adequacy, and feasibility; determine additional requirements, if any; make required modifications; list advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

Comparison of Own Courses of Action

- Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.
- Compare with respect to governing factors: fixed values for joint operations (the principles of war, the fundamentals of joint warfare, and the elements of operational art); other critical factors (for example, political constraints); and mission accomplishment.
- If appropriate, merge elements of different COAs into one.

Decision. Translate the selected COA into a concise statement of what the force, as a whole, is to do and explain, as may be appropriate, the following elements: when, where, how, and why.

Related Terms

CINC's strategic estimate

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

EVACUATION POLICY

Command decision indicating the length in days of the maximum period of noneffectiveness that patients may be held within the command for treatment. Patients who, in the opinion of responsible medical officers, cannot be returned to duty status within the period prescribed are evacuated by the first available means, provided the travel involved will not aggravate their disabilities. 2. A command decision concerning the movement of civilians from the proximity of military operations for security and safety reasons and involving the need to arrange for movement, reception, care, and control of such individuals. 3. Command policy concerning the evacuation of unserviceable or abandoned materiel and including designation of channels and destinations for evacuated materiel, the establishment of controls and procedures, and the dissemination of condition standards and disposition instructions. JP 1-02

The theater evacuation policy is established by the Secretary of Defense upon the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommendation of the geographic combatant commander. (The policy states, in number of days, the maximum period of noneffectiveness [hospitalization or convalescence] that casualties may be held within the theater for treatment.) The policy does not imply that a casualty must be held in the theater for the entire period for treatment. Casualties who are not expected to return to duty within the number of days expressed in the theater evacuation policy are evacuated as soon as their medical condition permits. Shorter evacuation policies within the theater reduce theater bed requirements and increase the number of beds required elsewhere. Shorter policies also increase evacuation requirements.

The time period stated in the theater evacuation policy starts when a patient is admitted to the first hospital (Echelon III). The total time a patient spends in all medical treatment

facilities (MTFs) in the theater for a single episode of wounding, injury, or illness should not exceed the number of allowable days of noneffectiveness stated in the theater evacuation policy. This policy is flexible and changes as the tactical situation shifts. This ensures that nonfixed MTFs retain mobility and the capability to accommodate anticipated surges of patients.

Related Terms

health service support

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

EXECUTE ORDER

1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National Command Authorities decision to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. JP 1-02

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reflecting the decision of the National Command Authorities, publishes the EXECUTE ORDER. The EXECUTE ORDER, issued BY AUTHORITY AND DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, orders the supported commander to execute his operation order. The EXECUTE ORDER is normally a simple, straightforward message directing the deployment and employment of forces. However, in extremely time-sensitive situations, the EXECUTE ORDER may be the only message provided in a crisis. In such situations, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensures that the EXECUTE ORDER contains the information normally provided in the WARNING and ALERT ORDERs. Throughout the operation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitors the deployment and employment of forces and takes actions needed to effect a quick and successful termination of the crisis. In those instances where the crisis response does not progress into Execution, crisis action planning (CAP) Procedures Phase VI, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will evaluate the situation and provide the combatant commander guidance on either continuing under CAP procedures or developing a plan to expand, reduce, or continue planning using the deliberate planning procedures delineated in CJCSM 3122.03, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)."

Related Terms

alert order; crisis action planning; planning order; warning order

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

EXECUTION PLANNING

The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System crisis action planning process that provides for the translation of an approved course of action into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a complete operation plan or operation order. Execution planning is detailed planning for the commitment of specified forces and resources. During crisis action planning, an approved operation plan or other National Command Authorities-approved course of action is adjusted, refined, and translated into an operation order. Execution planning can proceed on the basis of prior deliberate planning, or it can take place in the absence of prior planning. JP 1-02

A National Command Authorities (NCA)-approved course of action (COA) is transformed into an operation order (OPORD) during the execution planning phase of crisis action planning, as shown in the figure below. In this phase, the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) performs the detailed planning necessary to execute the approved COA when directed by the NCA. If required by the situation, the supported commander will initiate campaign planning or refine a campaign plan already in development. This should guide the development of the OPORD.

Actual forces, sustainment, and strategic mobility resources are identified and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format. Following crisis action planning procedures and using capabilities provided through Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the supported commander develops the OPORD and supporting timed-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) by modifying an existing operation plan, expanding an existing operation plan in concept format (with or without TPFDD), or developing a new plan. Supporting commanders providing augmenting forces identify and task specific units and provide movement requirements. Component commanders identify and update sustainment requirements in coordination with the Services.

US Transportation Command develops transportation schedules to support the requirements identified by the supported commander. A transportation schedule does not mean that the



supported commander's TPFDD or COA is transportation feasible; rather, the schedules developed are the most effective and realistic given the numbers and types of assets and their location in relation to C-day and L-hour. The Services determine mobilization requirements and plan for the provision of nonunit sustainment. Force preparation action is accomplished throughout the JPEC in accordance with deployment postures directed by the Secretary of Defense, and deployability posture reporting is initiated.

The Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitor execution planning activities, resolve shortfalls when required, and review the supported commander's OPORD for feasibility and adequacy. The execution planning phase terminates with an NCA decision to implement the OPORD. In those instances where the crisis does not progress to implementation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides guidance regarding continued planning under either crisis action or deliberate planning procedures. If the NCA decide to execute the OPORD, planning enters its final phase: execution.

Related Terms

crisis action planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

EXECUTIVE AGENT

A term used in Department of Defense and Service regulations to indicate a delegation of authority by a superior to a subordinate to act on behalf of the superior. An agreement between equals does not create an executive agent. For example, a Service cannot become a Department of Defense Executive Agent for a particular matter with simply the agreement of the other Services; such authority must be delegated by the Secretary of Defense. Designation as executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the executive agent. An executive agent may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions, or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specified purposes. JP 1-02

The Secretary of Defense may designate one of his immediate subordinates, normally the Secretary of a Military Department or a combatant commander, to act as his executive agent for the performance of duties or activities, normally temporary or transitory, which do not warrant assignment of an additional permanent function. The purpose, scope of authority, and duration of such designation is made clear in the establishing directive. Executive agent responsibilities and activities assigned to the Secretary of a Military Department may serve as justification of budgetary requirements but will not be used as the basis for establishing additional force requirements. Responsibilities of an Executive Agent are as shown in the figure below.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF AN EXECUTIVE AGENT

- Implement and comply with the relevant policies and directives of the Secretary of Defense.
- Ensure proper coordination among Military Departments, the combatant commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense agencies and DOD field activities as appropriate for the responsibilities and activities assigned.
- Issue directives to other DOD components and take action on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, to the extent authorized in the directive establishing the executive agent.
- Make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for actions regarding the activity for which designated the executive agent, including the manner and timing for dissolution of these responsibilities and duties.
- Perform such other duties and observe such limitations as may be set forth in the directive establishing the executive agent.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

FACILITIES

facility
A real property entity consisting of one or more of the following: a building, a structure, a utility system, pavement, and underlying land. JP 1-02

The commander of a combatant command (CINC) is responsible for the coordination of planning, programming, and construction of facilities within the command. Additionally, the CINC should determine the priorities in the programming of facilities necessary to support the mission. Contingency construction project requests in overseas areas require validation by the CINC. The CINC may establish a Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB) to assist in managing facilities.

The JFUB evaluates and reconciles component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, inter-Service support, and construction to ensure compliance with Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB) priorities. The JFUB is activated on the order of a joint force commander and chaired by the Logistics Directorate, with members from component commands and any required special activities (e.g., legal and civil affairs). The JFUB also provides administrative support and functions as the executive agency for the tasking of the JCMEB.

Facility requirements are optimized consistent with expected operational requirements, duration of need, and forces to be supported. If facilities must be acquired to support joint operations, the requirements should be satisfied in the following order, consistent with operational imperatives and economic judgment:

- Use existing facilities owned, occupied, or leased by the US in a theater of operations.
- Use US-owned relocatable buildings and facility substitutes prepositioned in the theater of operations.
- Exercise the provisions of host-nation support agreements.
- Acquire existing facilities in the theater of operations from commercial sources.



Navy SEABEEs use contingency construction skills to construct strong back tent villages for Cuban migrants during Operation SEA SIGNAL.

- Use US-owned relocatable buildings and facility substitutes located outside the theater of operations.
- Construct new facilities.

Facility designs are developed using the following principles:

- Maintenance requirements are considered in the design of facilities.
- Facility scopes are based on Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum-275-89.
- Standard facility designs are developed to meet Service doctrinal requirements based on site condition assumptions and structural configurations to sustain anticipated unit equipment. The standard designs should, therefore, be construed as valid for most situations. The designs may be modified based on operational, environmental, unusual site, or unique customer requirements. The availability of relocatable shelters or facility substitutes also may have design implications.

Construction standards, shown in the figure below, determine the types of materials and construction techniques used in constructing facilities in support of contingency operations. Contingency construction standards provide criteria that minimize engineer efforts while providing facilities of a quality consistent with the mission requirements, personnel health and safety, and the expected availability of construction resources. Where mission requirements are similar, facilities should be constructed to the same standards by all Services. Construction requirements may be met by commercial, off-the-shelf building systems that are austere and rapidly erectable, and yet have a life span that exceeds even the temporary standard if that alternative is as cost or operationally effective.



The figure below provides examples of the types of construction considered under initial and temporary standards.

STANDARDS OF CONSTRUCTION		
TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION	INITIAL	TEMPORARY
Site preparation	Clearing and grading for facilities sites, including drainage, revetments for petroleum, oils, and lubricants and ammo storage and aircraft parking; aggregate for heavily used hardstands; and soil stabilization.	Engineering site preparation, including pavement for vehicle traffic areas and aircraft parking, building foundations, and concrete floor slabs.
Troop housing	Tents (may have wood frames and flooring).	Wood frame structures; relocatable structures; mobile structures.
Electricity	Tactical generators; high and low voltage distribution.	Nontactical generators and high or low voltage distribution.
Water	Water points, wells, and/or other potable water production and pressurized water distribution systems.	Limited distribution to hospitals, dining halls, and other large users.
Cold storage	Portable refrigeration with freezer units for medical, food, and maintenance storage.	Refrigeration installed in temporary structures.
Sanitation	Organic equipment, evaporative ponds, pit or burnout latrines, lagoons for hospitals, and sewage lift stations.	Waterborne to austere treatment facility. Priorities are hospitals, dining halls, bath houses, decontamination sites, and other high volume water users.
Airfield pavement	Tactical surfacing, including matting aggregate, soil stabilization, and concrete pads.	Conventional pavement.*
Fuel storage	Bladders.	Bladders and steel tanks.
* The type of airfield surfacing to be used will be based on the expected number and weight of aircraft involved in operations.		

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support

FEASIBILITY

Operation plan review criterion. The determination of whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished by using available resources. JP 1-02

Feasible plans accomplish assigned tasks with resources that are available within the time frames contemplated by the plan. Measures to enhance feasibility include ensuring effective employment schemes, sufficiency of resources and capabilities, and maintaining alternatives and reserves.

Related Terms

acceptability; adequacy

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

FIELD SERVICES

Combatant commanders are responsible for the search, recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel within their theaters. The responsibility extends not only to deceased personnel of US forces, but also to allied, third country, and enemy dead. For humanitarian, health, and morale reasons, this responsibility may extend to the local populace. Combatant commanders are responsible for controlling and coordinating mortuary affairs operations within their theaters. This responsibility also pertains to peacetime mass fatality incidents.

Related Terms

mortuary affairs

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

FIGHTER ENGAGEMENT ZONE

See weapon engagement zone. JP 1-02

Fighter engagement zone (FEZ) operations usually take place in airspace above and beyond the engagement ranges of surface-based (land and sea) and short-range air defense systems and are an alternative engagement operation if the detailed control aspects of joint engagement operations cannot be met. The principle of meeting the massed combat airpower of the enemy with comparable mass to defeat enemy efforts is highly dependent on coordination and flexibility within the airspace control system in the combat zone. Under FEZ operations, surface-to-air missile systems will not be allowed to fire weapons unless targets are positively identified as hostile and assigned by higher authority, or unless they are firing in self-defense. FEZ operations offer great ability for the joint force commander to respond immediately with fighter assets to an enemy air offensive regardless of its location. FEZ and missile engagement zone operations present the enemy with the dilemma of defending against two entirely different

weapon systems, greatly decreasing enemy survivability. FEZ operations within the airspace control area should not result in undue restraints on the ability of surface-based air defense systems to engage the threat.

FEZs normally will be established in those areas where no effective surface-to-air capability is deployed. These operations usually take place in airspace above and beyond the engagement ranges of surface-based (land and sea), short-range air defense systems, and are an alternative type of engagement operation if the detailed control aspects of joint engagement operations cannot be met. FEZ is an air defense control measure.

From an air defense perspective, FEZ normally is used when fighter aircraft have the clear operational advantage over surface-based systems. These advantages could include range, density of fire, rules of engagement, or coordination requirements. From an airspace control perspective, FEZ provides airspace users with location of the engagement zone for fighter aircraft for mission planning purposes.

Coordination and flexibility within the combat airspace control system may be a limiting factor with FEZ. Under FEZ operations, surface-to-air missile systems will not be allowed to fire weapons unless targets are positively identified as hostile and assigned by higher authority, or unless they are firing in self defense.

The area air defense commander is the point of contact.

Related Terms

weapon engagement zone

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

FORCE EXTRACTION

Force extraction theater airlift operations involve the combat air movement of personnel, units, and materiel from positions in the immediate vicinity of enemy forces. Because the purpose of these movements may range from withdrawal operations to the lateral movement of forces to new operating locations, the relationship of operational and logistic considerations can vary widely. These operations generally are planned to accomplish a movement with the minimum expenditure of airlift resources. However, in higher threat situations it may also be necessary to preserve the combat capabilities of departing units for as long as possible at the departure terminal, while building them up as rapidly as possible at the arrival terminal. In such cases, operational requirements may be more important than the efficient use of allowable cabin loads. In the latter stages of a complete extraction of friendly forces from a combat area, planners should provide suitable operational assets to protect both the extracting forces and the airlift forces engaged in their movement. Extractions are logistical backhaul operations. Commanders must evaluate the risk of extracting materiel as compared to the impact of abandonment and replacement.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

FORCE INTERACTION

Force interaction with regard to enemy forces is another way for joint force commanders (JFCs) to achieve concentration in the various dimensions. JFCs arrange symmetrical and

asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. The history of joint operations highlights the enormous lethality of asymmetrical operations and the great operational sensitivity to such threats. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against enemy weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Asymmetrical operations are particularly effective when applied against enemy forces not postured for immediate tactical battle but instead operating in more vulnerable aspects — operational deployment and/or movement, extended logistic activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and training (including industrial production). Thus, JFCs aggressively seek opportunities to apply asymmetrical force against an enemy in as vulnerable an aspect as possible — air attacks against enemy ground formations in convoy (the air and special operations forces interdiction operations against German attempts to reinforce its forces in Normandy), naval attacks against troop transports (US attacks against Japanese reinforcement of Guadalcanal), and land operations against enemy naval, air, or missile bases (allied maneuver in Europe in 1944 to reduce German submarine bases and V-1 and V-2 launching sites). There are literally dozens of potential modes of attack to be considered as JFCs plan the application of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces against the various aspects of enemy capabilities.

As a final part of force interaction, JFCs must take action to protect or shield all elements of the joint force from enemy symmetrical and asymmetrical action. This function of protection has particular relevance in joint warfare, as JFCs seek to reduce the vulnerability of their forces and enhance their own freedom of action.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

FORCE MODULE

A grouping of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, with their accompanying supplies and the required nonunit resupply and personnel necessary to sustain forces for a minimum of 30 days. The elements of force modules are linked together or are uniquely identified so that they may be extracted from or adjusted as an entity in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data bases to enhance flexibility and usefulness of the operation plan during a crisis. Also called FM. JP 1-02

Force modules are a planning and execution tool that provides a means of logically grouping records, which facilitates planning, analysis, and monitoring. Force modules may include both forces and sustainment. There are three types of force modules.

Service or Supporting Command Force Module. Built by the Service or supporting command headquarters to represent the notional force structure of a given major unit. The Service Force Module contains combat force(s), combat support, combat service support, and sustainment for a minimum of 30 days. The Service Force Modules contain type units and an estimate of accompanying supplies and non-unit-related sustainment materiel required to support the unit. Current sustainment in Service Force Modules is developed by a combination of hand-generated data and computer-generated data based on Service-developed sustainment factors and will be used to determine gross transportation feasibility. The Service

Force Module is designed to be a basic building block to aid the planner in both deliberate and crisis action planning.

Operation Plan (OPLAN)-Dependent Force Module. OPLAN-Dependent Force Modules are force modules that have been modified or developed by supported CINC or Service components to respond to a specific planning task, such as flexible deterrent options or OPLAN Force Module Packages.

Force Tracking Force Module. This force module is OPLAN dependent and does not contain sustainment data. Force Tracking Force Modules, as a minimum, will consist of major Service combat units and are required for all OPLANs.

Related Terms

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

FORCE MOVEMENT CONTROL CENTER

Marine Corps components usually control requests for theater air movements through coordinated actions by the component movement control center, the command element's force movement control center (FMCC) of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), and the Air Force tactical air control system. The process is initiated when the MAGTF FMCC transmits an airlift request to the joint movement center for validation and the joint air operations center for information. When airlift is approved, the MAGTF logistics movement control center organizes combat service support units to support the move.

Related Terms

joint movement center

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

FORCE PLANNING

Planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments and Services. JP 1-02

Military planning includes two broad categories of planning: force planning and joint operation planning. (See figure below.)

Force planning is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments, Services, and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and is conducted under administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the Chiefs of the Services. The Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. USSOCOM has similar responsibility for special operation forces, with the exception of organizing Service components.



Related Terms

joint operation planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

FORCE PROJECTION

The National Command Authorities may direct combatant commanders to resolve a crisis quickly, employing immediately available forward-presence forces, and, at the lowest level possible, to preclude escalation of the crisis. When this response is not enough, the projection of forces from the continental US or another theater may be necessary. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic airlift and sealift, and prepositioned forces. For example, the ability to generate high intensity combat power from the sea can provide for effective force projection operations in the absence of timely or unencumbered access.

Force projection usually begins as a rapid response to a crisis. Alert may come with little or no notice, bringing with it tremendous stress on personnel and systems, accompanied by requests from the media for information. In any event, rapid, yet measured, response is critical.

Joint forces participate in force projection operations in both war and operations other than war. These operations may be either unopposed or opposed by an adversary. Joint force commanders (JFCs) sequence, enable, and protect the arrival of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. An example of enabling and protecting the arrival of forces when access is initially unavailable is the seizure and defense of lodgment areas by naval forces, which would then serve as initial entry points for the continuous and uninterrupted flow of additional forces and materiel into the theater. To accomplish this decisive advantage, forcible entry operations may be required at the onset. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic airlift and sealift, and pre-positioned forces. Both types of operations demand a versatile mix of forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to respond quickly.

Opposed operations require a viable forcible entry capability with forces prepared to fight immediately upon entry. Unopposed operations may afford an opportunity, following arrival in the operational area, to continue to build combat power, train, rehearse, acclimate, and otherwise establish the conditions for successful operations. In unopposed entry, JFCs control

the flow of forces that best facilitates the buildup of forces necessary for the envisioned operations. Logistic capability may be a higher priority than combat capability, which could be initially limited to that needed for protection.

The protection of forces will often be a friendly center of gravity during early entry operations. Therefore, early entry forces should deploy with sufficient organic and supporting capabilities to preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel and equipment from potential or likely threats.

JFCs introduce forces in a manner that enables rapid force buildup into the structure required for anticipated operations and simultaneous protection of the force. From a command and

Airlift is a cornerstone of global force projection.

control (C2) perspective, echelonment is essential. Early entry forces should include the C2 capability to assess the situation, make decisions, and conduct initial operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

FORCE PROTECTION

Security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. JP 1-02

In peacetime, geographic combatant commanders establish measures and procedures that preserve the combat power of their forces. In wartime, geographic combatant commanders carry out assigned and implied missions in pursuit of theater strategic objectives derived from national and alliance or coalition strategic goals. Force protection responsibilities are

modified as necessary in order to ensure security of assigned forces and to protect US interests in their areas of responsibility.

Force protection can be significantly improved with the proper mix of intelligence and information gathering. As soon as practical after an operation is declared, joint force commanders and planners determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the operation. Intelligence planners also consider the capability for a unit to receive external intelligence support, the capability to store intelligence data, the timeliness of collection systems, the availability of on-the-shelf intelligence publications, and the possibility of using other agencies and organizations as intelligence sources. In some military operations other than war (such as peacekeeping), the term "information gathering" is used rather than the term "intelligence" because of the sensitivity of the operation.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 3-10	Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations

FORCES AND FUNCTIONS

Commanders and planners can design campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both. Typically, joint force commanders (JFCs) structure operations to attack both enemy forces and functions concurrently in order to create the greatest possible contact area between friendly and enemy forces and capabilities. These types of operations are especially appropriate when friendly forces enjoy technological and/or numerical superiority over an opponent.

JFCs can focus on destroying and disrupting critical enemy functions such as command and control, resupply, and air defense. Attack of an enemy's functions is normally intended to destroy enemy balance, thereby creating vulnerabilities to be exploited. Destruction or disruption of critical enemy functions can create uncertainty, confusion, and even panic in enemy leadership and forces and may contribute directly to the collapse of enemy capability and will. The appropriateness of functional attack as the principal design concept frequently is based on time required and available to cripple enemy critical functions as well as the enemy's current actions and likely response to such attacks.

Related Terms

operational art

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations

FORCIBLE ENTRY

Forcible entry is seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. In many situations, forcible entry is the only method for gaining access into the operational area or for introducing decisive forces into the region. Forcible entry capabilities give joint force commanders (JFCs) unique opportunities for altering the nature of the situation, such as the opportunity for gaining the initiative at the outset of combat operations. Forcible entry operations can strike directly at enemy centers of gravity and can open new avenues for military operations. Forcible entry operations can horizontally escalate the operation, exceeding the enemy's capability to respond. Forcible entry operations are normally joint

operations and may include airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations, or any combination thereof. Subordinate joint and Service publications provide details on these operations.

Forcible entry is normally complex and risky. These operations require detailed intelligence and unity of effort. Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. Forcible entry forces need to be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence capabilities to move with forward elements. Operations security and deception are critical to successful forcible entry. Forcible entry relies on speed and surprise and is almost always employed in coordination with special operations. Forcible entry usually requires support from naval gunfire and/or aviation assets. Follow-on forces need to be prepared to expand the operation, sustain the effort, and accomplish the mission.

Special operations forces (SOF) may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, and modify conditions in the area of the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or ports. They may provide fire support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry. They may conduct special reconnaissance and interdiction operations well beyond the lodgment.

The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry operations can be formidable, but must not be allowed to become such an overriding concern that the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. JFCs carefully balance the introduction of logistic forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment.

Forcible entry has been conducted throughout the history of the Armed Forces of the United States. Forcible entry is usually a complex operation and should therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. When airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of effort is vital. Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry.

Operation JUST CAUSE

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander in Chief, US Southern Command, JTF Panama, conducted multiple, simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. By parachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force buildup and to launch immediate assaults against the PDF.

The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with numerous other operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint force. The parachute assault forces strategically deployed at staggered times from CONUS bases, some in C-141 Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. One large formation experienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield — its operations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted for assault operations because of intelligence that indicated a possible compromise. SOF reconnaissance and direct action teams provided last-minute information on widely dispersed targets.

At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets — most of them in the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that JFCs organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation, the JTF commander employed land and SOFs to attack strategic targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets.

The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attack against enemy C2 facilities and key units, seized the initiative and paralyzed enemy decision making. Most fighting was concluded within 24 hours. Casualties were minimized. It was a classic coup de main.

Related Terms

airdrop; amphibious operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. JP 1-02

Foreign internal defense (FID) programs encompass the total political, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency. US military support to FID should focus on assisting host nation (HN) personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. FID supports HN internal defense and development (IDAD) programs. US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused on helping another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government. US FID programs may address other threats to an HN's internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. US military support to FID may include training, materiel, advice, or other assistance, including direct support and combat operations as authorized by the National Command Authorities (NCA), to HN forces in executing an IDAD program. FID is a principal special operations mission.

When it is in the interests of US national security, the US may employ all elements of national power to assist a friendly nation in conducting IDAD programs. For FID to be successful in meeting an HN's needs, the United States Government (USG) must integrate efforts of multiple government agencies. Ideally the FID program will incorporate all elements in a synergistic manner that supports HN requirements and US national policy and interests in the most advantageous way.

Such integration and coordination are essentially vertical between levels of command and organization, and horizontal between USG agencies and HN military and civilian agencies. In addition, integration and coordination requirements may extend to allied nations participating with the United States in multinational FID efforts. As is evident in the figure below, the lines of organization and command and control in a FID situation are interwoven and often unclear. This factor, combined with the breadth of potential FID operations, makes complete integration and coordination of all national FID efforts a daunting challenge.

Combatant commands with geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) are responsible for planning and executing military operations in support of FID in their regions. Other unified commands play a supporting role to those combatant commanders by providing resources to conduct operations as directed by the NCA. The combatant commander has the responsibility of coordinating and monitoring all the military activities in his AOR in support of FID programs. The priority and importance of the FID mission will depend on the individual theater; however, in certain areas FID may represent the combatant commander's most



important peacetime mission. Organizing for military operations in FID will vary, but there are fundamental principles that apply when planning or executing FID operations as shown in the following examples:

- Military activities in support of FID are an integral part of the long-range strategic plans and objectives for the command's AOR. These plans must reflect national security priorities and guidance.
- Although planning and executing military operations in FID require a coordinated staff and interagency effort, responsibility and accountability remain with the designated planning and operations section.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07	Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
JP 3-07.1	JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

FORWARD IMPETUS

The impetus of logistic support is from the continental US into the theater and forward. A system of continuous replenishment may take the form of either automatic (push) replenishment or requisitioning (pull) replenishment. Whenever possible, the push system is preferred to increase scheduled replenishment and reduce requirements on the logistic command, control, communications, and computers system. Ideally, forward commanders should be relieved of logistic support details without impairing control of their organic logistic support capabilities.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0	Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

FORWARD OPERATING BASE

An airfield used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities. The base may be used for an extended time period. Support by a main operating base will be required to provide backup support for a forward operating base. Also called FOB. JP 1-02

Forward Operating Bases (FOB). Forward deployment of fixed-wing close air support (CAS) aircraft offers several advantages. Operating from locations close to the battle area can increase loiter time in the objective area, extend effective combat radius, and, perhaps most importantly, make the CAS firepower more responsive to ground commanders by shortening the response time. Preplanned logistic support is vital to ensure sufficient ammunition, fuel, and servicing equipment is in position and ready for use when it is needed.

Supported units should provide a forecast of anticipated CAS targets, so appropriate munitions can be transported to FOBs and prepared for use. Supporting units are responsible for keeping FOBs operational by planning for and carrying out logistical support. FOB logistical support is a function of the number and type of aircraft using the location, operations tempo, quantity and type of munitions being employed, and system-specific support requirements.

Logistics is a very important consideration when more than one component is operating out of a FOB. Direct liaison between all units involved is vital, and can be critical to mission success. Considerations include munitions handling equipment, fuel connections, type and grade of fuel, and weapon arming and fuzing equipment and configurations.

Air Direct Delivery. Air direct delivery is a strategic airlift mission which lands at a forward operating base and does not involve a theater airlift transshipment in conjunction with the strategic airlift. Considerations in selecting air direct delivery are shown in the figure below and include:



- ground plan;
- suppression of enemy air defenses;
- proximity and capacity of airfields at destination;
- offload capability at destination airfield to include the need for additional materials handling equipment and logistical personnel;
- the ground force package may be designed for delivery from continental US to forward areas. Light forces have limited organic transportation capability.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-09.3	JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)
JP 3-17	JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

FORWARD PRESENCE

Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence activities include periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, port visits, foreign military training, foreign community support and military-to-military contacts. Given their location and knowledge of the region, forward presence forces could be the first which the combatant commander commits to military operations other than war.

Related Terms

deterrence

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

FRATRICIDE

Joint force commanders (JFCs) make every effort to reduce the potential for fratricide — the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate preventative measures. The primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands, rehearsals, and enhanced situational awareness. Commanders should seek to minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity in combat.

Though occasionally the result of malfunctioning weapons, fratricide has often been the result of confusion on the battlefield. Causes include misidentification of targets, target location errors, target locations incorrectly transmitted or received, and loss of situational awareness by either terminal controllers, close air support (CAS) aircrews, or requestors. The bottom line is that it is critical for all participants in the CAS process to realize that they can contribute to unintentional or inadvertent friendly fire incidents.

All participants in the CAS employment process — maneuver commanders, fire support coordinators, targeteers, terminal controllers, and aircrews — are responsible for the effective and safe execution of CAS. Each participant must make every effort possible to ensure friendly units and enemy forces are correctly identified prior to the release of ordnance. JFCs, components, and units must habitually emphasize joint training that routinely exercises these joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to create a knowledge and understanding of the battlefield in situations in which CAS may be employed.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 3-09.3 JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)

FRICTION, CHANGE, AND UNCERTAINTY

Friction, chance, and uncertainty still characterize battle. Their cumulative effect comprises "the fog of war." We have, for instance, no precisely defined picture of where, when, for how long, or why we may be obliged to use force in the defense of our nation or its friends and allies. We must be prepared for a broad range of possibilities. Modern technology will not eliminate friction, chance, or uncertainty from military undertakings. Indeed, the massive quantity of information available to modern commanders produces its own component of uncertainty. Instead, friction, chance, and uncertainty are an inevitable part of the medium in which we operate. We should prepare mentally, physically, and psychologically to deal with this.

External friction (caused by factors outside our control, such as weather or the enemy) is essentially inescapable, though we can sometimes mitigate its effects. Internal "friction" caused by excessive rivalries may also confront military forces from time to time. The desire to excel and the competition of differing points of views are indispensable to healthy military organizations. However, there is no place for rivalry that seeks to undercut or denigrate fellow members of the joint team; we must harness all our energies for dealing with our enemies. Effective teamwork among the Armed Forces of the United States helps reduce and cope with the various frictions associated with military endeavors.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

FULL EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

Nations should share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and adversary to attain the best possible common understanding of threatened interests, determine relevant and attainable objectives, and achieve unified efforts against the adversary. (See figure below.) The methodology for exchanging intelligence should be conceived and exercised well before operations begin. The exchange must be monitored and, when necessary, adapted during operations to meet better understood or changing circumstances. The combatant command Intelligence Directorates should have personnel knowledgeable in foreign disclosure policy and procedures and should obtain necessary foreign disclosure authorization from the Defense Intelligence Agency as soon as possible. Assignment to the joint or multinational task force of personnel familiar with foreign disclosure regulations will facilitate the efficient flow of intelligence.

Sharing intelligence sources and methods, including cooperative intelligence collection and production, may help attain the common objectives of the alliance members or coalition partners. When, however, intelligence sources and methods cannot be shared among allied or coalition nations, the intelligence should be provided after it is sanitized by effectively separating the information from the sources and methods used to obtain it. This sanitizing process must also be exercised in peacetime for both known and probable allies. Intelligence production agencies should consider use of tear lines to separate that intelligence and/or information within a given report that may be immediately disclosed to alliance members or coalition partners.



Related Terms

intelligence

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

FULL MOBILIZATION

See mobilization. JP 1-02

Full Mobilization Authority. The President, upon a declaration of national emergency or war by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law, may invoke 10 USC 12301(a) authorizing the Secretary of Defense to direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments to order to active duty any member of the Ready Reserve, Retired Reserve, Standby Reserve, without their consent, for the duration of the emergency or war plus six months.

Related Terms

mobilization

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

FULL PROCEDURAL CONTROL

A method of airspace control which relies on a combination of previously agreed and promulgated orders and procedures. JP 1-02

Full procedural control would rely on previously agreed to and promulgated air space control measures such as comprehensive air defense identification procedures and rules of engagement, low-level transit routes, minimum-risk routes, minimum-risk levels, aircraft identification maneuvers, fire support coordination measures, and coordinating altitudes. In any case, all missions remain subject to the airspace control order. The figure below summarizes both methods of airspace control.



Related Terms

full positive control

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

FUNCTIONAL

Sometimes a joint force based solely on military functions without respect to a specific geographic region is more suitable in order to fix responsibility for certain types of continuing operations (e.g., the unified commands for transportation, space, special operations, and strategic operations). The commander of a joint force established on a functional basis is assigned a functional responsibility by the establishing authority. When defining functional responsibilities, the focus should be on the effect desired or service provided. The title of the functional responsibility and its delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive.

FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND

The missions or tasks assigned to the commander of a functional command may require that certain installations and activities of that commander be partially or wholly exempt from the command authority of an area commander in whose area they are located or within which they operate. Such exemptions must be specified by the authority who establishes the functional command. Such exemptions do not relieve the commanders of functional commands of the responsibility to coordinate with the affected area commanders.

Related Terms

functional component command

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND

A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. JP 1-02

Combatant commanders and commanders of subordinate unified commands and joint task forces have the authority to establish functional component commands to control military operations. Functional component commanders have authority over forces or military capability made available to them. Functional component commands may be established across the range of military operations to perform operational missions that may be of short or extended duration. Joint force commanders (JFCs) may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. (NOTE: Functional component commands are component commands of a joint force and do not constitute a "joint force" with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force as described in this document even when composed of forces from two or more Military Departments. (See figure below.)

The JFC establishing a functional component command has the authority to designate its commander. Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces



to be tasked will be designated as the functional component commander; however, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the command and control capabilities in selecting a commander.

The responsibilities and authority of a functional component command must be assigned by the establishing JFC. The establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the JFC. The JFC must designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s) the functional component commander will exercise (e.g., a joint force special operations component commander normally has operational control of assigned forces and a joint force air component commander is normally delegated tactical control of the sorties or other military capability made available).

The commander of a functional component command is responsible for making recommendations to the establishing commander on the proper employment of the military capability made available to accomplish the assigned responsibilities.

The functional component commander will normally be a Service component commander. As a Service component commander, the functional component commander also has the responsibilities associated with Service component command for those assigned forces. When a functional component command is composed of forces of two or more Services, the functional component commander must be cognizant of the constraints imposed by logistic factors on the capability of the assigned forces and the responsibilities retained by the Service component commanders.

When a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Service, the functional component commander's staff should reflect the composition of the functional component command in order to provide the commander with the expertise needed to effectively employ the forces made available. Staff billets for the needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified and used when the functional component staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations. The number of personnel on this staff should be kept to the minimum and should be consistent with the task performed. The structure of the staff should be flexible enough to expand or contract under changing conditions without a loss in coordination or capability.

Related Terms

Service component command

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

FUNCTIONAL PLANS

Plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements such as disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of US citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations, or similar discrete tasks. They may be developed in response to the requirements of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, at the initiative of the CINC, or as tasked by the supported combatant commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Defense agency. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of CINC-initiated plans is not normally required. JP 1-02

Functional plans involve the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment. These plans are traditionally developed for specific functions or discrete tasks (e.g., nuclear weapon recovery or evacuation, logistics, communications, or continuity of operations) but may be developed to address functional peacetime operations such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or counterdrug operations. Functional plans will be written using the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System procedures and formats specified for an operation plan in concept format (without time-phased force and deployment data).

Related Terms

joint operation planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

FUSION

1. The process whereby the nuclei of light elements combine to form the nucleus of a heavier element, with the release of tremendous amounts of energy. 2. In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources of intelligence and information to derive a complete assessment of activity. JP 1-02

Intelligence Fusion. All-source intelligence fusion must begin with collection and production planning. Each source can provide useful information and cues for collection and exploitation through other sources.

Information Fusion. The ultimate goal of command, control, communications, and computers systems is to produce a picture of the battlespace that is accurate and meets the needs of warfighters. This goal is achieved by fusing, i.e., reducing information to the minimum essentials and putting it in a form that people can act on. There is no one fusing of information that meets the needs of all warriors. However, with concise, accurate, timely, and relevant information, unity of effort is improved and uncertainty is reduced, enabling the force as a whole to exploit opportunities and fight smarter.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

GENERAL SUPPORT

See support.

GEOGRAPHIC AREA

Establishing a joint force on a geographic area basis is the most common method to assign responsibility for continuing operations. The commander of a combatant command established on an area basis is assigned a geographic area by the establishing authority. The title of the areas and their delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive. A joint force commander (JFC) assigned a geographic area is considered an area commander. Note: Only commanders of combatant commands are assigned areas of responsibility. Subordinate JFCs are normally assigned joint operations areas.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) provides a fused picture of the battlespace within a modern command, control, communications, and computers system capable of meeting warfighter needs into the 21st century. It incorporates the core planning and assessment tools required by the combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders and meets the readiness support requirements of the Services. GCCS is required to move the combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders joint command and control support capability into the modern era of client/server architecture using commercial, open systems standards for both commercial and government off-the-shelf applications. The umbrella standards and unifying approach that GCCS brings to the ongoing Department of Defense command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence system migration strategy are essential for the Services and agencies to successfully reduce the large number of systems in use today.

Related Terms

command, control, communications, and computer systems; worldwide military command and control system

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

GLOBAL INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Advances in information technologies and continued reduction in cost of information-related equipment and systems continue to fuel an explosion of networks around the globe that form the infosphere. In reality, the various labels placed on systems and networks are misleading as there are no discrete boundaries in the information environment. All are

inextricably intertwined and this trend will only intensify with the continuous application of rapidly advancing technology.

Viewing this environment as an infosphere reveals its true nature. This worldwide telecommunications web transcends industry, media, and the military and includes both government and nongovernment entities. The infosphere electronically links organizations and individuals around the globe. It is characterized by a merging of civilian and military information networks and technologies. While the benefits received are tremendous, reliance on this technology and infrastructure generates dependence and dependence creates vulnerabilities that have to be accounted for and overcome.

In the post-Cold War era, US military forces are tasked with a wide variety of missions, from disaster relief, to peacekeeping, to fighting a major regional conflict. Declining resources dictate that the US military accomplish this wider variety of roles and missions with a smaller force structure. Historically, the US military has relied on technology as a force multiplier to accomplish assigned missions as efficiently as possible while preserving human life and limiting the destruction of property. One way to accomplish such missions efficiently is to leverage sophisticated information technologies. Today, and in the future, efficient use of information technologies will require the support of the infosphere, including both an evolving national and defense information infrastructure.

Related Terms

command, control, communications, and computers

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

GLOBAL PATIENT MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS CENTER

The Global Patient Movement Requirements Center (GPMRC) is located at Scott Air Force Base, IL. The GPMRC coordinates aeromedical evacuation worldwide and encompasses those duties formerly associated with the Armed Services Medical Regulating Office and the Aeromedical Evacuation Coordination Center. In practice, the GPMRC will coordinate and allocate assets to the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Centers (TPMRCs). It will also collaborate and integrate TPMRC schedules and plans, and communicate lift/bed requirements.

Related Terms

aeromedical evacuation; Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02 Doctrine of Health Service Support in Joint Operations

GRADUATED RESPONSE

Graduated Response Process. The graduated response (GR) process (see figure below) provides a planning framework for the national direction and control of military and national mobilization activities. Overall responsibility for GR rests with the National Security Council and its interagency structure. Virtually every Federal agency has a role to play in managing a national response to a crisis. National resources in the 12 resource areas (manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, health service support, communications, host-nation support, environment, legal authorities, and funding) are focused on defense needs. The Department of Defense (DOD) provides support to the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during natural disasters under the Federal Response Plan. FEMA coordinates the actions and programs of the other Federal agencies in support of DOD during regional contingencies and mobilization efforts.

Mobilization Preparedness Activity. The GR concept comprises three stages of mobilization preparedness activity: planning and preparation, crisis management, and national emergency or war.

Stage III — Planning and Preparation. In Stage III, the US maintains vigilance, observing national and international events for developing threats to national security. Federal departments and agencies develop emergency plans and maintain the capability to carry out the plans within funding limitations. Although essentially a period of peace, it is during this stage that the gradual emergence of a potential new threat would be perceived and actions could be taken to deter the threat.

Stage II — Crisis Management. Stage II activities are designed around options for responding to specific crisis situations as they develop. The DOD and other Federal departments and agencies initiate preparatory actions that are not feasible during Stage III because of resource constraints or the absence of a more specific basis for focused planning and preparation. During this stage, the nation's civilian leadership may elect not to risk political capital and significant economic disruption; these are characteristic of overt mobilization actions, but leaders may approve limited actions for improving US preparedness. Such actions would be designed to maximize response potential with minimum disruption of the economy. Limited surge of the defense industrial base, a Presidential declaration of national emergency, and a Presidential Selected Reserve Callup could occur as Stage II actions.

Stage I — National Emergency or War. In Stage I, the US begins a mobilization of the economy for a crisis or war. A Presidential or congressional declaration of national emergency



should be expected at an early point in Stage I activities. The principal distinguishing feature between Stages I and II is a substantial increase in the magnitude of defense industrial production and other essential national defense activities. Industrial base expansion will be characterized by expanding facilities, building new facilities, and conversion of non-defense producers. Critical resources could be diverted from nonessential production, and significant disruption of the national economy would be a consequence. The increased demand for resources would mandate increased interagency coordination and support of mobilization actions and prioritization of resource shortages.

Successful GR requires effective interagency coordination in each stage to synchronize production capacity, labor force expansion and stabilization, economic and trade policies, energy and transportation allocations, and other actions that prepare the US to respond to hostilities and signal its commitment to national security.

Related Terms

mobilization

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

All services performed, provided, or arranged by the Services to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, medical food, and medical intelligence services. JP 1-02

The health service support (HSS) mission in joint operations is to minimize the effects of wounds, injuries, and disease on unit effectiveness, readiness, and morale. This mission is accomplished by a proactive preventive medicine program and a phased health care system (echelons of care) that extends from actions taken at the point of wounding, injury, or illness to evacuation from a theater for treatment at a hospital in the continental United States (CONUS). One measure of this system's effectiveness is its ability to save life and limb, to reduce the disease and nonbattle injury rate, and to return patients to duty quickly and as far forward in the theater as possible. Another measure is the system's ability to evacuate patients to the Communications Zone or out of the theater as appropriate, within the operational evacuation policy, with a minimum delay.

Vietnam: From the Field to the Hospital

Field evacuation and hospitalization of wounded in Vietnam was different from any previously carried out in any war. In addition it varied both in time and place within Vietnam. It was characterized by the absence of front lines and the traditional chain of evacuation. In general, the wounded Soldier was apt to receive his wounds while with a small group or unit isolated deep in roadless jungle, and the wounds were more apt to be multiple over all parts of the body than in any previous war. First aid and emergency medical treatment given on the site by company aid men, however, differed little from previous times. Resuscitative equipment and procedures included pressure dressings, tourniquets, and airways. Morphine was available but seldom used, as pain was not usually a problem at this point and aid men were aware of the depressant effects of morphine. In all likelihood, the patient would be evacuated within a relatively few minutes by helicopter, either a medical ambulance craft or a tactical one. The facilities available for resuscitation aboard the helicopter varied depending on whether it was a medical ("dust-off") helicopter or a combat helicopter. IV fluid, usually Ringer's Lactate solution, was often available, and trained medical technicians and emergency equipment were also present on dust-off helicopters.

The destinations of the helicopters varied. In some areas patients were taken to aid stations or medical companies. More often the helicopter flew the patients directly to a surgical hospital where they could receive definitive care. Blood and electrolyte solutions were often available at aid stations and medical

and clearing companies, as was some surgical capability. Complete surgical facilities, including anesthetists, were available at clearing companies, but definitive surgery was usually not done here. At times battalion surgeons flew forward to a site of combat, bringing blood and other supplies which were given on the spot.

Hospitals fulfilled much the same function for combat wounded, whether they were surgical hospitals, field hospitals, or evacuation hospitals. By and large they were all "semipermanent," usually buildings set on a concrete floor, air-conditioned and with all utilities and other equipment of a first-rate hospital in the continental United States.

Resuscitation of a Vietnam war casualty was an extremely rapid and sophisticated procedure. The patient would often be brought to the hospital directly from the battlefield by medical evacuation helicopter, frequently in less than an hour. Usually he received emergency treatment on the battlefield, to include control of hemorrhage, wound dressing, respiratory control, and often the starting of intravenous fluid. At the hospital, he was immediately taken to the resuscitation area where he was surrounded by a large team of highly trained physicians, nurses, and technicians.

The results of this prompt and efficient treatment may perhaps be best illustrated by comparing them with similar statistics from previous wars. In Vietnam, 46,000 of 346,000, or 13 percent, of all wounded American Soldiers died. If 22 percent had died, as was true in Korea, there would have been 77,840 deaths, 31,840 more than actually occurred. In World War II, 28 percent of all wounded American Soldiers died. If the medical treatment of Vietnam had been available during World War II, 117,748 Soldiers would have been saved.

Source: Hardaway, Robert M., M.D., Care of the Wounded in Vietnam, Sunflower University Press, 1988.

As shown in the figure below, each Service component has an HSS system that encompasses the following six health care principles:

- Conformity. Integration and compliance with the commander's plan are the basic elements of effective HSS. HSS planners can help ensure conformity by taking part in development of the commander's operation plan.
- Proximity. The objective of proximity is to provide HSS to the wounded, injured, or sick as close to combat operations as the tactical situation permits. In many cases, time may be as important a factor as distance. Patients are evacuated to an medical treatment facility (MTF), or the MTF is moved to the area where the patient population is the greatest.
- Flexibility. Changes in tactical plans or operations make this HSS principle essential. Units must be prepared to shift HSS resources to meet changing requirements. All HSS units are used within the theater with none held in reserve, so plans for redistribution of HSS resources are required.
- Mobility. Using both organic and nonorganic transportation resources, commanders should anticipate requirements for rapid movement of HSS units to support combat forces during operations. This HSS principle is closely aligned to that of proximity.



- Continuity. The objective is to provide optimum, uninterrupted care and treatment to the wounded, injured, and sick. Continuity in care and treatment is achieved by moving the patient through a progressive, phased HSS system, which extends from the forward area of the combat zone to an area as far rearward as the patient's condition requires, possibly to CONUS. Continuity is also achieved by providing continued care during movement.
- Coordination. The objective of this principle is to ensure that HSS resources in short supply are efficiently employed and used to effectively support the planned operation. Continuous coordination ensures that MTFs are not placed in areas that interfere with combat operations. Additionally, continuous coordination ensures that the scope and quality of medical treatment and care meet professional standards and policies.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

HIGH-ALTITUDE MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONE

See weapon engagement zone. JP 1-02

Normally applied to long-range surface-to-air missiles, a high-altitude missile engagement zone (HIMEZ) will limit the volume of airspace within which these weapons may conduct engagements without specific direction of the area air defense commander (AADC). HIMEZ

is an air defense control measure. From an air defense perspective, HIMEZ normally is used when a high-altitude missile system has a clear operational advantage over using aircraft. These advantages could include range, command and control, rules of engagement, or response time. From an airspace control perspective, it provides airspace users with location of the engagement zone of a high-altitude missile system for mission planning purposes. The design of the HIMEZ is contingent on specific weapon system capabilities. The point of contact for establishing a HIMEZ is the AADC.

Related Terms

weapon engagement zone

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

HIGH-DENSITY AIRSPACE CONTROL ZONE

Airspace designated in an airspace control plan or airspace control order, in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons and airspace users. A high-density airspace control zone has defined dimensions, which usually coincide with geographical features or navigational aids. Access to a high-density airspace control zone is normally controlled by the maneuver commander. The maneuver commander can also direct a more restrictive weapons status within the high-density airspace control zone. Also called HIDACZ. JP 1-02

The high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ) is an area in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons or airspace users. HIDACZ has defined dimensions that usually coincide with geographical features or navigational aids. Access to and air defense weapons status within a high-density airspace control zone is normally approved by the appropriate commander.

HIDACZ allows ground/Marine air-ground task force commanders to restrict a volume of airspace from users not involved with ongoing operations. It restricts use of the airspace because of the large volume and density of fires supporting the ground operations within the described geographic area. The volume of air traffic demands careful coordination to limit the potential conflict among aircraft needed for mission essential operations within the HIDACZ and other airspace users. When establishing a HIDACZ, consider the following:

- Minimum risk routes into and out of the HIDACZ and to the target area.
- Air traffic advisory as required. Procedures and systems also must be considered for air traffic control service during instrument meteorological conditions.
- Procedures for expeditious movement of aircraft into and out of the HIDACZ.
- Coordination of fire support, as well as air defense weapons control orders or status within and in the vicinity of the HIDACZ.
- Location of enemy forces inside of and within close proximity to the HIDACZ.
- HIDACZ is nominated by the ground commander and approved by the airspace control authority.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. JP 1-02

Nations hosting US joint forces may offer logistic support or limit the ability of the joint force to contract support only through host-government agencies. Joint force commanders can consider centralizing host-nation support (HNS) functions so that requirements are both identified and supported, consistent with mission accomplishment. Nations might agree to have certain common supplies and support provided by member nations to other alliance or coalition forces. Nations might also agree on whether a multinational commander will have the authority to conclude HNS arrangements on behalf of participating nations.

Geographic combatant commanders will obtain authority for negotiations with host nations (HNs) through Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Department of State channels. Assistance sought from HNs can include, but is not limited to, petroleum, oils, and lubricants; transportation; telecommunications; civilian labor; rear area protection; facilities; contracting; acquisition of equipment; supplies; services; and health service support. Areas of potential HNS are shown in the figure below.

Geographic combatant commanders must coordinate with the HN for the acquisition and use of facilities and real estate. Geographic combatant commanders and component commanders will ensure use of existing HNS, if applicable, to avoid duplication of effort with the HN. Component commanders will inform the combatant commander if an acquisition cross-service agreement (ACSA) exists with the HN. If one does not exist, the commander of a combatant command or subordinate commander can take steps to initiate an ACSA with the HN when having one would be advantageous.

Geographic combatant commanders and component commanders should make every effort to obtain language support for negotiations with local nationals. The most effective negotiations occur when military members show competence in local language and customs.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 4-0	Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. JP 1-02

Intelligence capabilities and skills should be established in peacetime to be available for contingencies. This applies to all intelligence disciplines, but is especially true for human intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT is not surged easily or with certainty. Relatively long leadtimes are required to establish human intelligence resources and systems. If HUMINT access to denied areas is to be available when needed, then the resources should be developed and operated in advance of anticipated operations. Also, language capabilities are an example of skills that should be developed in peacetime to be available for contingencies.

In military operations other than war conducted outside the US, HUMINT may provide the most useful source of information. However, a HUMINT infrastructure may not be in place when US forces arrive; therefore, it needs to be established as quickly as possible. HUMINT can supplement other intelligence sources with psychological information not available through technical means. For example, while overhead imagery may graphically depict the number of people gathered in the town square, it cannot gauge motivations or enthusiasm of the crowds . Additionally, in underdeveloped areas belligerent forces may not rely heavily on radio communication, denying US forces intelligence derived through signal intercept. HUMINT is required to supplement signals intelligence and overhead imagery which we typically rely upon to produce the most accurate products.

Related Terms

intelligence

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0	Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations
JP 3-07	Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. JP 1-02

Humanitarian assistance (HA) operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the US. HA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration; it is intended to supplement or complement efforts of host-nation civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing assistance. The Department of Defense (DOD) provides assistance when the relief need is gravely urgent and when the humanitarian emergency dwarfs the ability of normal relief agencies to effectively respond. (See figure below.)

The US military can respond rapidly to emergencies or disasters and achieve order in austere locations. US forces can provide logistics; command, control, communications, and computers; and the planning required to initiate and sustain HA operations.

HA operations may be directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA) when a serious international situation threatens the political or military stability of a region considered of interest to the US, or when the NCA deems the humanitarian situation itself sufficient and appropriate for employment of US forces. Department of State or the US ambassador in country is responsible for declaring a foreign disaster or situation that requires HA. Within DOD, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has the overall responsibility for developing the military policy for international HA operations.

HA operations may cover a broad range of missions. An HA mission could also include securing an environment to allow humanitarian relief efforts to proceed. US military forces participate in three basic types of HA operations: those coordinated by the United Nations, those where the US acts in concert with other multinational forces, or those where the US responds unilaterally.

Examples of HA are Operations SEA ANGEL I, conducted in 1991, and SEA ANGEL II, conducted in 1992, to provide assistance in the aftermath of devastating natural disasters in Bangladesh.



Operation SEA ANGEL

Bangladesh has traditionally been one of nature's favorite targets. Tornadoes, cyclones, and monsoons occur with alarming regularity in this country, which contains the world's second largest delta region at the confluence of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Magma rivers. While this tremendously fertile region supports over 120 million people, damage from natural disasters is often severe, mainly due to the low terrain, the high density of the population, and a poorly developed infrastructure.

Cyclone Marian struck this delta on the southeast coast during the evening of 29 April 1991 with winds in excess of 235 km/hr and tidal surges between 15 and 20 feet. Well over 100,000 people died and millions were left homeless. Over 1 million cattle (essential for pulling plows and providing transportation) died. Crops on 74,000 acres of land were destroyed; another 300,000 acres of cropland were damaged, and fields were covered with salt water, contaminating the soil and corrupting the drinking water.

Infrastructure destruction was widespread. Bangladesh's major port, Chittagong, was severely damaged and was nonoperational for several days. Damaged/sunken ships, many of them belonging to the Bangladeshi Navy, blocked the port. Several key bridges, including the main bridge to Chittagong, were washed out or otherwise damaged. Throughout the storm-affected area, sea walls collapsed, jetties disappeared, dirt roads were flooded, buildings were ravaged, and transportation was virtually destroyed.

For the government of Bangladesh (GOB), the cyclone could not have come at a worse time. After years of military rule, Bangladesh had installed its first civilian government, under Prime Minister Zia, less than two months earlier. Therefore, the young, inexperienced government, sensitive to appearing weak or incompetent and struggling domestically to develop bureaucratic cohesion, faced serious problems in reacting to the cyclone.

Strangely, one of the problems was not one of relief supplies availability. Adequate emergency supplies existed either in government storage houses, called "Go Downs," or stored and owned by nongovernmental organizations (NGO) such as Cooperative American Relief Everywhere (CARE) and the Red Crescent. The GOB, however, was hindered by the lack of cooperation from the NGO, which remembered martial law and were wary of the new regime. Further, the bureaucrats that controlled the grain in the "Go Downs" were similarly reluctant to hand over control to other agencies.

Notwithstanding these political hurdles, the most serious problem was one of distribution. The combination of a poorly developed infrastructure and the havoc wreaked by the cyclone effectively cut off Chittagong for several days. Further, once relief supplies were brought to Chittagong, the GOB Operation SEA ANGEL virtually had no means to distribute them to isolated islands off the coast where needs were most acute.

On 10 May 1991, the President directed the US military to provide humanitarian assistance. A Contingency Joint Task Force (CJTF) was immediately formed under the command of Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole, commander of

the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) based in Okinawa. A US Navy Amphibious Task Force (ATF) returning from the Persian Gulf war was redirected to Bangladesh. A Bangladesh citizen, spotting the ATF approaching from the water, allegedly called them "Angels from the Sea." Regardless of whether this incident ever occurred, news of it spread and Operation SEA ANGEL had begun.

The relief effort truly was an international operation. Besides the indigenous GOB forces and the international and local NGO, several countries joined the United States in participating. The United Kingdom sent a supply ship with four helicopters. The Japanese government sent two helicopters. India, Pakistan, and China also provided assistance.

Two days after the President's order, LtGen. Stackpole arrived with a small CJTF element. A Special Operations Forces (SOF) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) arrived later that day. The next day five UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters arrived from Hawaii, along with a Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit. Other joint assets continued to flow into the area, as required. Fifteen soldiers of B Company, 84th Engineer Battalion, already deployed to Bangladesh to construct schools, were diverted to Chittagong. The bulk of US forces were from the ATF consisting of the 4,600 Marines of the 5th MEB, 3,000 sailors of Amphibious Group 3, and 28 helicopters. The MEB also brought four Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) vehicles, which proved invaluable in delivering aid to isolated islands.

Immediately upon his arrival in the capitol city of Dhaka, LtGen. Stackpole began an assessment of the situation, and identified three critical concerns: First, the intelligence needed to adequately assess the situation was unavailable; Second, the problem of distribution quickly became apparent, and was considered the most pressing by the Joint Task Force (JTF) staff; Finally, the issue of Bangladeshi sovereignty required that the GOB be clearly viewed by the populace as being "in charge".

LtGen. Stackpole proceeded to develop a Campaign Plan consisting of three phases. After initial survey, liaison, and reconnaissance, Phase I (one week) entailed initial stabilization of the situation (delivery of food, water, and medicine to reduce loss of life). Phase II (two weeks) entailed restoring the situation to the point where the Bangladesh government could take control of relief efforts. Phase III (two weeks) was the consolidation phase in which the Task Force would depart and the Bangladesh government would take complete control of all relief efforts.

The distribution problem clearly was the most demanding task and it's accomplishment was most critical to the success of the operation. There were two aspects: first, supplies had to be moved from Dhaka to Chittagong; second, these supplies then had to be moved to the devastated islands. The decision was made to fly supplies by fixed-wing to Chittagong, then via helicopter to the islands. The MC-130 aircraft that brought the special operations forces provided the fixed-wing capability until Air Force C-130s arrived. A JTF augmentation cell (including the five Blackhawk helicopters) was dispatched from Hawaii. The 5th MEB and its helicopters and LCACs arrived three days later.

In the final analysis, Operation SEA ANGEL proved to be unique in several respects. It was almost entirely sea-based, with no more than 500 service members on shore at night. It was conducted in a benign environment; no weapons were carried by US forces, except for some sidearms carried by guards of cryptographic materials. It was also the first time that a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) was used as a joint task force nucleus. Finally, a unique effective command and control structure was used to synchronize the efforts of US, British, Bangladeshi, and Japanese nongovernmental organizations, and other organizations such as the US Agency for International Development (AID) and a Chinese assistance element.

Source: McCarthy, Paul A.,
Operation Sea Angel, a Case Study,
RAND, 1994

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War